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“PACKAGE DEAL”: THE CURIOUS RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE IMPLIED
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
IN DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
MONICA E. WHITE*
ABSTRACT
Since 1977, the popularity of the limited liability company (“LLC”) has grown
tremendously, overtaking the corporation and the partnership as the preferred
business structure in many jurisdictions. Amidst this growth in popularity, a legal
debate has sparked concerning the existence, nature, and extent of the fiduciary and
contractual duties owed in the LLC context.
Drafters of LLC agreements can adjust fiduciary “norms” through limitation or, in
certain jurisdictions like Delaware, through complete elimination of fiduciary duties.
However, the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing (the
“Implied Covenant” or the “Covenant”) remains and cannot be waived by the
parties. This delicate balance between waivable duties and an unwaivable covenant
begs two key questions: What, if any, is the relationship between fiduciary duties
and the Implied Covenant, and where is the boundary between the two? Further,
how is the scope of the Implied Covenant affected when an LLC agreement
eliminates fiduciary duties? The answers to these questions are critical in separating
permissible acts under an LLC agreement from acts giving rise to causes of action for
breach of contract.
The relationship between fiduciary duties and the Implied Covenant is marked by
an inherent tension that the Delaware courts have yet to properly resolve. Rather,
these courts have structured an extremely narrow view of the Covenant, and have
sometimes conflated the Covenant with fiduciary duties, thereby reducing the
effectiveness of the Covenant as an independent means of enforcing behavioral
norms arising from contractual relationships. Consequently, parties to LLC
agreements have been left to question whether the Implied Covenant has any
significance independent of fiduciary duties. This Article attempts to shed light on
this dilemma, but cautions that, in this unique context, protection under the
Covenant appears to be illusory when fiduciary duties are no longer in play.
* Associate (Corporate), Baker Botts L.L.P.; J.D., magna cum laude, University of Houston Law Center
(2012); B.S., Economics and Political Science, summa cum laude, University of Houston (2009). Many thanks to
Professor Douglas Moll for his invaluable insight and comments. Thanks also to the editors of the University of
Miami Business Law Review for their efforts in preparing this Article for publication.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Until the late twentieth century, long-term business relationships
were generally either structured as partnerships or corporations.1 Each of
these structures came with distinct benefits and disadvantages. For
example, the partnership structure was easy to form, but had the potential
to expose some or all of the partners to unlimited personal liability for the
obligations of the partnership;2 the corporate structure shielded
shareholders, directors and officers from personal liability, but resulted in
double taxation on the corporation’s profits and dividends.3 However, in
1977, a hybrid entity structure known as the limited liability company
(“LLC”) was introduced in Wyoming, arguably creating a business
organization possessing the best features of the partnership and corporate
forms.4 Among other benefits, LLCs shielded the personal assets of their
members and managers from liability, and offered partnership-style, pass-
through taxation.5 Since 1977, the popularity of the LLC has grown
tremendously, overtaking the corporation and the partnership as the
preferred business structure in many jurisdictions.6 However, amidst this
growth in popularity, a legal debate has sparked concerning the existence,
1 See Mary Szto, Limited Liability Morality: Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
61, 63–64 (2004) (discussing the emergence of the limited liability company form).
2 A partnership is formed by an “association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit,” UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6 (1914), whether the parties intended to form a partnership or not,
REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a) (1997). No statutory formalities must be followed. Until the 1990s, no
partnership structure provided completely unlimited liability. The general partnership form burdened all partners
with unlimited personal liability for the obligations of the partnership. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 15; REVISED UNIF.
P’SHIP ACT § 306(a). The limited partnership form, composed of general partners and limited partners, only
provided limited liability for limited partners. However, depending on what statute applied, even the limited
partners could lose their limited liability status if they participated in management and control of the business. See,
e.g., UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 7 (1916) (“A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in
addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business.”).
The limited liability partnership (“LLP”) form, providing limited liability for all partners, was not conceived until
well after the LLC form was in existence, when Texas enacted the first LLP statute in 1991. Fallany O. Stover &
Susan Pace Hamill, The LLC Versus LLP Conundrum: Advice for Businesses Contemplating the Choice, 50 ALA. L.
REV. 813, 815 (1999).
3 Edward D. Biggers, Federal Taxation—Publicly Traded Partnerships Deemed Corporations for Federal
Taxation Purposes: New Internal Revenue Code Section 7704, 19 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1158, 1158 (1988).
4 Rita Cain & Larry R. Garrison, The Limited Liability Company: When Is It the Right Choice?, 11 J. ST.
TAX’N 52, 52–53 (1993); Szto, supra note 1, at 61–65. R
5 Szto, supra note 1, at 61–65. R
6 Id. at 62; Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs are the New King of the Hill, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
459, 459–62 (2010); Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility and Legal
Indeterminancy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 219 (2011).
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nature, and extent of the fiduciary and contractual duties owed by LLC
members and managers to each other, and to the LLC itself.7
In the partnership and corporate contexts, the common law firmly
established the significance of fiduciary duties as mechanisms to ensure the
first priority of the interests of the individuals or entities to whom these
duties were owed.8 Later, statutory developments modified the extent to
which the fiduciary duties would regulate certain conduct.9 Now, ample
precedent and statutory guidance endow the creators of partnerships and
corporations with reasonable expectations regarding whether certain
actions will violate standards of fiduciary conduct.10
In contrast, LLCs are considered “creatures of contract”11—the
drafters of LLC agreements can adjust fiduciary “norms” through
limitation or, in certain jurisdictions like Delaware, through complete
elimination of fiduciary duties.12 However, the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing (the “Implied Covenant” or the “Covenant”)
remains and cannot be waived by the parties.13 This delicate balance
between waivable duties and an unwaivable covenant begs two key
questions: What, if any, is the relationship between fiduciary duties and
the Implied Covenant, and where is the boundary between the two?
Further, how is the scope of the Implied Covenant affected when an LLC
agreement eliminates fiduciary duties? The answers to these questions are
not entirely clear, but they are critical in separating permissible acts under
7 See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Planning Problems in the Limited Liability Company, 73 WASH. U. L. Q.
455, 477 (1995); Peter B. Ladig, Intersection Between Fiduciary Duties and Contract Rights May Be Headed for a
Showdown, DEL. BUS. CT. INSIDER (Aug. 17, 2011), available at http://www.delawarebusinesslitigation.com/
2011/09/articles/case-summaries/intersection-between-fiduciary-duties-and-contract-rights-may-be-headed-
for-a-showdown/; Sandra K. Miller, What Standards of Conduct Should Apply to Members and Managers of Limited
Liability Companies?, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 21, 28 (1994); Jean H. Toal & W. Bratton Riley, Fiduciary Duties of
Partners and Limited Liability Company Members Under South Carolina Law: A Perspective from the Bench, 56 S.C. L.
REV. 275, 276 (2004) (highlighting the debate between “fiduciarians” and “contractarians”); cf. Allan W. Vestal,
Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523, 523 (1993)
(“In the contemporary debate . . . , the fundamental question is whether to adopt a contractarian or fiduciary
view of partnerships.”).
8 See discussion infra Part II.
9 See discussion infra Part II.
10 See discussion infra Part II.
11 E.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 110 cmt. (2006).
12 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2005) (providing for the contractual elimination of
member and manager fiduciary duties); Sandra K. Miller, Legal Realism, the LLC, and a Balanced Approach to the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 729, 729–30 (2010); Szto, supra note 1, R
at 65–70.
13 Miller, supra note 12, at 730; e.g., tit. 6, § 18-1101(c). R
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an LLC agreement from acts giving rise to causes of action for breach of
contract.
Delaware is one jurisdiction in which the boundary between fiduciary
duties and the Implied Covenant is not readily apparent.14 For decades,
Delaware has had a preeminent reputation with respect to the formation
of incorporated, unincorporated, and “alternative” business entities
(including LLCs).15 In particular, its LLC statute is favored among parties
who value its flexibility, tax benefits, and minimal disclosure
requirements.16 In addition, Delaware’s vast business-law precedent and
chancery court system are added benefits should disputes arise.17
However, even in this sophisticated business-law state, the relationship
between optional fiduciary duties and the mandatory Covenant is far from
settled.18 Curiously, as a result of the tension inherent in this relationship,
a strange dilemma has developed. Rather than attempting to resolve the
tension, the Delaware courts have instead structured a very narrow view
of the Implied Covenant, and have conflated the Covenant with fiduciary
duties, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the Covenant as an
independent means of enforcing behavioral norms arising from
contractual relationships.19 Consequently, parties to LLC agreements have
been left to question whether the Implied Covenant has any significance
independent of fiduciary duties. This Article attempts to shed light on this
dilemma by unwinding the intricacies that link and differentiate these two
classes of obligations.
Part II explores the contours of fiduciary duties as they have
developed from Judge Cardozo’s iconic and open-ended pronouncement
in Meinhard v. Salmon to the more defined boundaries of fiduciary duties
in the uniform acts and corporate statutes. This Part also discusses the
emergence of LLCs and the fiduciary law that applies to these entities,
14 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 438
(1991) (characterizing the relationship between fiduciary duties and the Implied Covenant as “a blur . . . not a
line”); Ladig, supra note 7 (summarizing recent Delaware precedent and noting that the relationship between R
fiduciary duties and contract rights is yet to be clarified by the Delaware courts).
15 Manesh, supra note 6, at 218–19. The term “alternative entity” typically denotes “unincorporated R
business entities providing limited liability to their owners.” Miller, supra note 12, at 729 n.1. R
16 Id. at 252–53.
17 See id. at 215, 217–19.
18 See In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *142
n.184 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (stating that the corporate directors were liable for breaching their “dut[ies] of
loyalty and/or good faith,” and conceding that “the Delaware Supreme Court has yet to articulate the precise
differentiation between the duties of loyalty and of good faith”).
19 See discussion infra Parts III–VI.
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focusing special attention on Delaware—a jurisdiction that allows not
only modification of fiduciary duties, but also elimination of these duties
in alternative-entity agreements.
Part III discusses the meaning, scope, and application of the Implied
Covenant as it relates to fiduciary duties. Seeking to clarify the role of the
Covenant, this Part proposes a model for analyzing the relationship
between fiduciary duties and the Covenant with an eye towards
determining the contexts in which certain conduct would theoretically be
permitted as falling within provisions waiving fiduciary duties, but
prohibited as violating the Implied Covenant.
Part IV argues that Delaware’s approach to the Implied Covenant
skews the relationship between the Covenant and fiduciary duties, and
discusses the effect of Delaware’s tort- and contract-based strands of good-
faith jurisprudence on Covenant inquiries in the alternative-entity
context. Through detailed analysis of key cases arising in this context, this
Part also examines the importance of certain non-contractual factors in
contributing to the narrow scope of the Implied Covenant, and illustrates
that fiduciary waivers further reduce the Covenant’s influence in
Delaware.
Part V, drawing on the precedent discussed in Part IV, predicts that
Delaware’s approach to the Implied Covenant will not adequately
accommodate the expectations of parties in the average LLC when
fiduciary duties are eliminated. Part VI admits what the Delaware courts
have yet to concede—namely, that all indicators in Delaware suggest that
the Implied Covenant has no practical role when fiduciary duties have
been foreclosed by contract. Finally, Part VII cautions that fiduciary
waivers in this unique context risk leaving LLC parties with no recourse
should disputes arise under agreements that rely on the Implied Covenant
as their sole protective device.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Because LLCs are hybrid entities combining select features from
partnerships and corporations,20 it is useful to briefly examine the
evolution of fiduciary duties, first in the partnership and corporate
contexts, and then in the context of alternative entities.
20 Cain & Garrison, supra note 4, at 52–53. R
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A. The Starting Point: Fiduciary Duties in the Partnership Context
A fiduciary duty is a “duty of utmost good faith trust, confidence, and
candor owed by a fiduciary . . . to [a] beneficiary.”21 This duty mandates
that the fiduciary “act with the highest degree of honesty and loyalty
toward [the beneficiary] and in [their] best interests.”22 Unlike many
other legally imposed duties, the relevance of fiduciary duties is not
limited to discrete transactions. Rather, fiduciary duties concern the
governance of certain status relationships, and reflect broad, equitable
principles premised on trust, stewardship, and agency.23
The common law set an extremely high bar for the execution of
fiduciary duties. In Meinhard v. Salmon,24 the seminal case addressing
fiduciary duties, then-Judge Cardozo made the following iconic
pronouncement:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arms’
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a
tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned
to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the “disintegrating
erosion” of particular expectations. Only thus has the level of
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd.25
The Meinhard standard is virtually, and perhaps intentionally,
boundless. By failing to draw a clear line between acceptable and
objectionable conduct of a fiduciary, Meinhard provided an incentive for
fiduciaries to “aim high” in structuring their conduct to avoid findings
that they had breached their fiduciary duties.26 Although Meinhard clearly
21 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009).
22 Id.
23 See Szto, supra note 1, at 61. R
24 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
25 Id. at 546.
26 See Toal & Riley, supra note 7, at 276 (noting the difficulty in drafting agreements when the common R
law is unclear on the boundaries of fiduciary duty).
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established a caliber of conduct that would ensure that the beneficiaries of
fiduciary relationships were adequately protected, it also constituted a
“non-standard” that was difficult for courts to grasp and apply.27 Due to
Meinhard’s lack of clarity,28 courts responded by raising the fiduciary duty
“floor” in an attempt to meet Meinhard’s unbending demands. One
commentator coined the term “galloping Meinhardism”29 to connote this
“continuing extension of heightened, expansive, judicially-imposed
fiduciary duties.”30
Like the common law, the Uniform Partnership Act (“UPA”), which
predated Meinhard, failed to define specific fiduciary duties owed by one
partner to another, or by partners to the partnership itself.31 In fact, the
term “fiduciary” only appears in the title of UPA section 21.32 However,
UPA section 18 does list partners’ rights and duties in relation to the
partnership—including information, disclosure, and accounting—none of
which can be modified via contract.33 Rather than labeling section 18 as a
discrete list of fiduciary duties, the drafters of UPA left the courts to
determine the outer limits of fiduciary duties on a case-by-case basis.
Until 1997, UPA operated in a majority of jurisdictions in
conjunction with an accumulating common law gloss that refined UPA’s
scope and application.34 As did the common law, UPA exemplified the
expansive view that fiduciary duties encompassed a notion of fairness that
surpassed the four corners of the partnership agreement.35 However, in
most states, UPA and Meinhard-influenced common law notions of
fiduciary duties were soon overtaken by increasingly contractarian
conceptions of partnerships. Nothing exemplifies this trend more than the
27 Samuel J. Samaro, The Case for Fiduciary Duty as a Restraint on Employer Opportunism Under Sales
Commission Agreements, 8 U. PA. J. LABOR & EMP. L. 441, 486 (2006) (“The extent to which Judge Cardozo’s
soaring rhetoric [in Meinhard] is or in fact ever was a correct statement of law is unclear. For many years, lawyers,
judges and scholars have debated what [Cardozo’s] pretty language means ‘on the ground.’” (footnote omitted)).
28 Toal & Riley, supra note 7, at 276. R
29 Barbara Ann Banoff, Company Governance Under Florida’s Limited Liability Company Act, 30 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 53, 59 (2002).
30 Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager After More Than a Decade of
Experimentation?, 32 J. CORP. L. 565, 606 (2007) (quoting Banoff, supra note 29, at 59) (internal quotation marks R
omitted).
31 See Toal & Riley, supra note 7, at 278 (grouping UPA together with the common-law fiduciary duty R
regime). See generally UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1914).
32 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 21.
33 Id. § 18.
34 See Paul Powell, Comment, Dissociating the Fiduciary: Duty Revisions and the Resulting Confusion in
Idaho’s New Partnership Law, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 145, 147 (1999).
35 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 21.
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widespread enactment of the 1997 Revised Uniform Partnership Act
(“RUPA”). In 1986, the first signs of disfavor with UPA emerged in an
American Bar Association Business Law Section report hinting that UPA
needed to be overhauled.36 Between 1989 and 1997, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”)
formulated multiple working drafts of RUPA, and in 1997, RUPA
emerged in its final form and was subsequently adopted by a majority of
the states.37
Generally, it can be said that RUPA introduced a heavy dose of
contractarianism into the fiduciary-duty framework, and stripped away
the effectiveness of the common-law gloss that had accumulated with
respect to UPA. Under RUPA, fiduciary duties became exclusively
statutory obligations that were capable of being reasonably modified by
the partnership agreement.38 Where UPA and the common law failed to
set a limit on the expansiveness of fiduciary duties, RUPA section 404
announced that “[t]he only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the
partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of
care.”39 This language stopped the unbounded expansion of the scope of
fiduciary duties that characterized the common law.40 Rather, if a court
wanted to enforce a standard of conduct that surpassed section 404’s
statutory “floor,” the agreement of the parties would be the sole means of
establishing that standard.41 Therefore, RUPA effectively converted
fiduciary duty analysis from one solely based on status to one based, in
part, on contract. Only RUPA section 103(b) saves fiduciary duties from
complete elimination.42
Notably, the drafters of RUPA were fundamentally troubled with the
term “fiduciary” because it was “subject to abuse in the hands of judges,
academics, and others whose flow of satisfactions [was] derived in far too
large part from imposing their personal values on the more productive
36 UPA Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business
Organizations, Should the Uniform Partnership Act Be Revised?, 43 BUS. LAW. 121, 122 (1987).
37 Powell, supra note 34, at 147–48. R
38 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 103, 404 (1997).
39 Id. § 404 (emphasis added).
40 Allan W. Vestal, “Wide Open”: Nevada’s Innovative Market in Partnership Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV.
275, 277 (2006).
41 See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(a) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . relations among the
partners and between the partners and the partnership are governed by the partnership agreement.”).
42 See id. § 103(b).
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members of society.”43 Perhaps it was this line of reasoning that caused
RUPA to rarely use the term “fiduciary” explicitly.44 After all, RUPA
fundamentally altered the types of conduct that would satisfactorily
execute fiduciary duties, and therefore, indirectly changed the definition
of fiduciary duty itself.
For example, self-interested conduct—the very antithesis of conduct
becoming a fiduciary under UPA and the common law45—was no longer
strictly prohibited under RUPA.46 In spite of the fact that RUPA’s duty of
loyalty provision provides that partners must “refrain from dealing with
the partnership . . . as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to
the partnership,” RUPA section 404(e) states that a “partner does not
violate a duty of obligation under [this Act] or under the partnership
agreement merely because the partner’s conduct furthers the partner’s
own interest,” and RUPA section 404(f) states that a “partner may lend
money to and transact other business with the partnership.”47 In addition,
RUPA completely eliminated fiduciary duties during the phases prior to
the partnership’s formation and after the partnership’s dissolution.48
Further, the parties’ ability to agree, after-the-fact, that certain activities
would not breach fiduciary duties remained as it did under UPA and the
common law, providing yet another escape valve for parties wishing to
weaken these duties.49
RUPA’s fiduciary duty provisions proved to be controversial at best.
RUPA satisfied most contractarians by supporting freedom of contract
principles and deferring to the intent of the parties forming the
43 Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Midstream: Major Policy Decisions, 21 U. TOL.
L. REV. 825, 849 (1990).
44 The vast majority of RUPA’s explicit references to fiduciary duty are in the commentary, not in
RUPA’s main sections. Compare REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 404 cmt. 1, 405 cmt. 1, 603 cmt. 2, 803 cmt. 6,
807 cmt. 3, with REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(a) (providing that the only fiduciary duties owed are the duties
of loyalty and care).
45 See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879,
882 (“The fiduciary must avoid acts that put his interests in conflict with the beneficiary’s.”).
46 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(a).
47 Id. § 404(b)(2), (e)–(f).
48 See id. § 404(b)(3) (“A partner’s duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is limited to
the following: . . . to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership business before
the dissolution of the partnership.” (emphasis added)). Contra UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 21 (1914) (“Every partner
must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the
consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the
partnership.” (emphasis added)).
49 Vestal, supra note 7, at 559. R
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partnership.50 However, some contractarians argued that RUPA was
overly paternalistic and did not go far enough in honoring partnership
agreements.51 In contrast, RUPA outraged traditionalists who thought
that fiduciary duties should not be governed by black-letter rules and
bright-line tests, but should evolve based on morals, fairness, and societal
context. One commentator contended that RUPA’s reformulation of
fiduciary duties was “pinched and almost mean spirited.”52 Regardless,
RUPA’s push to transform fiduciary duties from a general manner of
conduct to a discrete set of amendable defaults had an influence on the
duties that would apply in the context of non-partnership entities.53
At bottom, RUPA contained the free-floating fog that was fiduciary
duty under the UPA–common-law regime. This containment eliminated
duties previously considered fiduciary in nature, and therefore opened a
gap between the “old” and “new” conceptions of fiduciary duty by
treating the partnership as a conglomeration of contracts rather than a
unique type of relationship.54 This gap—which RUPA allowed to be
expanded and contracted by the parties—arguably created a trap for the
unsophisticated or inadequately represented. This void would later be
widened by the uniform LLC Acts, and various state LLC statutes.55
B. The Corporate Fiduciary Standard
The corporate context has its own unique fiduciary duty paradigm.
Broadly speaking, corporate directors and officers, like partners in a
partnership, owe two fiduciary duties to the corporation—the duties of
care and loyalty.56 The duty of care is bifurcated into two separate
50 See Donald J. Weidner, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty: The Texture of Relationship, 58 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 81, 81–82 (1995) (noting that RUPA “represent[ed] a major and sufficient move toward a contractarian
statement of the law”).
51 Id. at 81; see also id. at n.3 (citing Professor Larry Ribstein, a leading contractarian in this arena, who
stated that RUPA “change[d] decades of prior law under the UPA,” by explicitly making fiduciary duties
mandatory among partners).
52 Vestal, supra note 40, at 280 & n.40 (citing Letter from Melvin A. Eisenberg to The Commissioners R
on Uniform State Laws, at 1 (July 27, 1992)).
53 See Stephanie Buck, Sanctioning Lawlessness: The Need to Apply Whistleblower and Wrongful Discharge
Protections to Members of Limited Liability Companies, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 711, 717–18 (2007) (noting that “[t]he
typical state LLC act is a combination of provisions from partnership and corporate law.”); Szto, supra note 1, at R
66, 106 (noting similarities between RUPA and the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act).
54 Powell, supra note 34, at 165. R
55 See discussion infra Part II.C.
56 See Carter G. Bishop, Directorial Abdication and the Taxonomic Role of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate
Law, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 905, 914–27.
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contexts. In the oversight context, directors and officers of a corporation
must discharge their duties in good faith as ordinary prudent people
would under similar circumstances and in like positions.57 In the
decisionmaking context, directors and officers of a corporation must make
the types of substantive and procedural decisions that prudent directors or
officers would make under similar circumstances.58
However, this decisionmaking duty is tempered by the business
judgment rule—a standard of review that validates the decisions of
directors and officers as long as those decisions were made in good faith
and according to a reasonable decisionmaking process free of bias or
conflicts of interest.59 The business judgment rule is the most lenient
standard of review used by courts in assessing the propriety of business
decisions.60 The rule is often phrased as a presumption that “sound
business judgment” was exercised if the decision “can be attributed to any
rational business purpose.”61 The business judgment rule is not derived
from the parties’ contract. Rather, it is based on the idea that some degree
of risk-taking is desirable in commercial enterprise, and that judges should
not scrutinize honest business decisions out of market context.62
In addition, other protections may be found in some corporate
statutes which contain exculpatory provisions that shield directors from
liability for violating the duty of care.63 Even though exculpation statutes
and the business judgment rule are not available for violations of loyalty or
good faith,64 these protections do for directors and officers what RUPA
does for partners accused by traditionalists of breaching their fiduciary
duties—they narrow the scope of conduct that is considered objectionable
under a duty of care analysis.
C. Fiduciary Duties in the LLC
The rise of the LLC created an entirely new framework for the
application and analysis of fiduciary and contractual duties. The LLC
57 See id. at 916–21.
58 See id.
59 See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (articulating the fundamentals of the
business judgment rule).
60 Heath P. Tarbert, Merger Breakup Fees: A Critical Challenge to Anglo-American Corporate Law, 34 LAW &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 627, 651 (2003).
61 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (emphasis added).
62 Tarbert, supra note 60, at 652. R
63 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005).
64 E.g., id.
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structure originated in Germany in 1892, and LLCs soon began to appear
in other civil law countries around the world.65 The emergence of the
LLC in the United States occurred relatively late, but response to the LLC
grew stronger as it became clearer how the LLC would fit into the
established framework of business entities. The immense popularity of the
LLC structure can be traced to favorable tax laws promulgated by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the needs of businesses in an
increasingly globalized economy.66
In 1977, the first American LLC statute was enacted in Wyoming, in
response to an oil company’s need to assume a structure similar to the
Latin American LLC equivalent.67 The Wyoming LLC statute was a
patchwork of provisions from the Wyoming corporate statute, the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, and UPA.68 However, due to the IRS’s
initial treatment of LLCs, this business structure was not an immediate
success. Until 1997, the IRS imposed corporate-style taxation on LLCs if
these entities possessed a “preponderance of corporate characteristics”—
continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability, and free
transferability of interests.69 Conversely, LLCs were taxed as partnerships if
they possessed a preponderance of partnership characteristics.70 Further,
the IRS proposed that LLCs would be taxed as corporations if their
members were not personally liable for LLC debts.71 The lack of clarity
and simplicity in LLC tax policy complicated LLC formation and stunted
the popularity of the LLC structure.72
In 1997, the IRS streamlined the taxation of LLCs by instituting a
“check-the-box” regime whereby an LLC could elect to be taxed as a
partnership without regard to the number of corporate characteristics it
possessed.73 Three years earlier, the Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act (“ULLCA”) was promulgated.74 However, the IRS’s unpredictable
treatment of LLCs prior to 1997 meant that, in response, most states had
65 Szto, supra note 1, at 63–65. R
66 Id.
67 Id. at 64.
68 William J. Carney, Close Corporations and the Wyoming Business Corporation Act: Time for a Change?, 12
LAND & WATER L. REV. 537, 581 (1977).
69 See 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1 to -4 (1997); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8106082 (Nov. 17, 1980).
70 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul., supra note 69. R
71 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (proposed Nov. 17, 1980) (proposal withdrawn at 48 Fed. Reg. 14389-02 (Apr.
4, 1983)).
72 Szto, supra note 1, at 64–65. R
73 See 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1 to -4.
74 Buck, supra note 53, at 718. R
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already enacted and amended their own LLC statutes by the time ULLCA
reached its final form.75 Therefore, unlike partnerships under state-
adopted versions UPA and RUPA, LLCs are largely a product of uniquely
tailored state law.76
Nevertheless, a brief look at ULLCA and the Revised Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act (“RULLCA”) is helpful as a baseline
against which to compare the Delaware LLC statute. Fiduciary duties are
implicated with respect to managers in an LLC,77 and ULLCA largely
mirrors RUPA’s narrow formulation of fiduciary defaults—the only duties
owed by an LLC member–manager to other members and the company
are the duties of care and loyalty.78 As under RUPA, these duties are
subject to reasonable modification by the parties under ULLCA.79 Non-
manager members are not subject to any fiduciary constraints under
ULLCA, yet are given virtually unrestricted access to company
information.80 Disclosure obligations remain non-fiduciary in nature, as
under RUPA.81 However, ULLCA was not widely adopted.82
In 2006, NCCUSL took another bite at the apple by enacting
RULLCA. Interestingly, RULLCA reverted to a UPA-type conception of
fiduciary duties—one that included, but was not limited to the duties of
loyalty and care.83 Therefore, RULLCA provided direction with regard to
LLC fiduciary duties without hindering the development of the common
law. Nevertheless, like ULLCA, RULLCA does not impose fiduciary
duties on non-manager members.84 However, unlike ULLCA, RULLCA
does subject non-manager members to the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing.85
Due to the limited adoption of ULLCA and RULLCA, individual
state LLC statutes carry more weight in the analysis of fiduciary duties in
the LLC setting.86 Because limited partnerships are alternative entities that
75 Id. at 717–18.
76 See id.
77 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (2005).
78 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 (2003).
79 See id. § 103(b)(2)(i).
80 Id. § 409(h)(1). See generally J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, Taming the Mandibles of Death, 59
CATH. U. L. REV. 183 (2009) (discussing the consequences of this set-up).
81 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 410(b)(2) (2006).
82 See supra text accompanying notes 74–76. R
83 See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409.
84 Callison & Vestal, supra note 80, at 186. R
85 Id.
86 Buck, supra note 53, at 717–20. R
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are analogous to LLCs for purposes of this Article, two Delaware statutes
merit attention—the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act
(“DLLCA”) and the Delaware Limited Partnership Act (“DRULPA”).
Both statutes are founded on strong contractarian policy, with a joint aim
to “give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to
the enforceability of [LLC and limited partnership] agreements.”87
When alternative entities became popular in Delaware, courts were
forced to make significant doctrinal adjustments to accommodate the
DLLCA and DRULPA frameworks. However, these adjustments did not
come naturally—after decades of developing partnership and corporate
law, the Delaware courts were accustomed to defaulting to fiduciary
duties given that these duties are mandatory, in some degree, in both the
partnership and corporate contexts.88
One example of this tendency to default to fiduciary norms in the
context of limited partnerships is the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision
in Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P.89 In that case, a
series of transactions proposed to Hallwood’s board of directors were at
issue. The transactions were contingent on financing via the purchase of
units generated in the transaction by Hallwood’s corporate parent.90
Gotham, a limited partner unitholder in Hallwood, brought action against
Hallwood’s general partner, alleging that the general partner breached its
fiduciary duties.91 When Gotham was decided, DRULPA allowed
partnership agreements to expand or restrict partner duties, but did not
explicitly provide for the elimination of fiduciary duties.92
Although traditional fiduciary duties would have applied in the
absence of explicit contractual provisions to the contrary, the parties in
Gotham contracted to allow the conduct that the plaintiffs later claimed
had breached the limited partnership’s fiduciary duty to its unitholders.93
On this contractual basis, the chancery court rejected Gotham’s fiduciary
87 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1101(b), 17-1101(c) (2005) (emphasis added).
88 See Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited
Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 16 (2007).
89 Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160 (Del. 2002).
90 Id. at 164–65.
91 Id. at 164, 166.
92 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d)(2) (2000) (amended 2004) (“[T]he partner’s or other person’s
duties and liabilities may be expanded or restricted by provisions in the partnership agreement.”).
93 See id. at 24 (noting that the partnership agreement “occup[ied] all the territory traditionally covered
by fiduciary duty doctrine”).
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duty claims.94 However, in a surprising turn of events on appeal, the
Delaware Supreme Court reverted to an “adherence to fiduciary duties
. . . normally expected,”95 even though such adherence ran contrary to
the contractual and applicable statutory language. Although the court
conceded that the partnership agreement “became the sole source of
protection for [Gotham],”96 the court was clearly uncomfortable with
the concept of abandoning a corporate-style fiduciary duty analysis in
favor of a statutory regime that allowed parties to govern their own
conduct apart from the pronouncements of the common law: “[W]e
note the historic cautionary approach of the courts of Delaware that
efforts by a fiduciary to escape a fiduciary duty, whether by a corporate
director or officer or other type of trustee, should be scrutinized
searchingly.”97 Therefore, the court insisted that the parties’ status took
precedence over the parties’ contract as an “underlying general principle
in [Delaware] jurisprudence.”98
After seeing that the Delaware Supreme Court was not recognizing
the legislative intent behind DRULPA, the Delaware legislature amended
DRULPA and preemptively amended DLLCA to expressly permit the
complete contractual elimination of fiduciary duties.99 These amendments
gave rise to a unique and challenging issue. Now, with the blessing of the
Delaware legislature, parties could avoid unfavorable court treatment
when they eliminated fiduciary duties. However, it was unclear what
meaningful protections would remain once the possibility of fiduciary
liability was foreclosed. Although the Implied Covenant remained
mandatory, the Delaware courts retained the power to determine whether
specific conduct would violate the Covenant, and thereby retained the
power to define the general scope of the Covenant’s application. Thus far,
these courts have chosen to exercise this power to significantly reduce the
Covenant’s significance.100
94 Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 795 A.2d 1, 24–26 (Del. Ch. 2001), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 817 A.2d 160.
95 Gotham, 817 A.2d at 167.
96 Id. at 171.
97 Id. at 168.
98 Id. at 167.
99 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c) (2005).
100 See discussion infra Parts IV–V.
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III. THE ROLE OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND
FAIR DEALING
“Good faith and fair dealing” is one of the most commonly used
phrases in the legal lexicon, yet the conceptual framework behind it is
incredibly abstract and has yet to be precisely defined.101 After all,
“attempt[s] to capture in a set of normally necessary and sufficient
conditions some characteristic or characteristics common to all things that
are or could be called ‘good faith’ is doomed to failure.”102 Whereas
fiduciary duties are defined in positive terms, the Implied Covenant is
generally defined in negative terms. For example, in Meinhard, then-Judge
Cardozo set a high, albeit vague, standard of “undivided loyalty” and the
“punctilio of an honor most sensitive;”103 UPA section 18 creates a basic
framework of partnership rights and duties upon which courts have built;
and RUPA section 404 provides, as a default matter, that the fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care are owed in the partnership context.104 In
contrast, the Implied Covenant lacks an established general meaning,105
and courts have routinely defined good faith as something akin to “not
bad faith,” rather than set specific standards of conduct that would satisfy
the Covenant’s boundaries.106 To complete the circular reasoning, case
law has often defined bad faith as a lack of good faith.107
Nevertheless, at bottom, the Implied Covenant seeks to give effect to
the contemplations and intentions of the parties.108 On one hand, the
parties can promote private expectations during the negotiation phase of
contract formation.109 On the other hand, once that agreement is
reached, good faith and fair dealing mandates that the parties adhere to the
bargain that was struck and refrain from taking opportunistic advantage of
fellow parties.110 In general, the Implied Covenant requires parties to
101 Robert M. Phillips, Comment, Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1179, 1184–85 (1993).
102 Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 810, 828 n.89 (1982).
103 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
104 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18 (1914); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(a)–(c) (1997).
105 Summers, supra note 102, at 820. R
106 See Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 442 (Del. 2005).
107 Steele, supra note 88, at 16. R
108 Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination of Fiduciary Duties: A Theory of Good Faith for Unincorporated
Forms, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 136 (2006).
109 See Allied Capital Corp. v. GC–Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1024 (Del. Ch. 2006)
(suggesting that it is the parties’ responsibility to extract substantive rights during contract negotiations).
110 Gold, supra note 108, at 134. R
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avoid “arbitrary or unreasonable conduct which has the effect of
preventing the other party to the contract from receiving the [contract’s]
fruits.”111
These principles are fairly straightforward. However, when the
analysis of a dispute involves both fiduciary duties and the Implied
Covenant in a hybrid entity like the LLC, the relationship between the
two obligations becomes highly complex because neither obligation is
conducive to discrete measurement.112
A. How Does the Implied Covenant Relate to Fiduciary Duties?
While outlining the contours of fiduciary duties has been made easier
with the development of the Uniform Acts and state statutes,113 defining
the Implied Covenant in a vacuum is a much more challenging endeavor
with little practical significance.114 Worse still, attempting to glean a
relationship between fiduciary duties and the Implied Covenant is almost
impossibly abstract.115 Nevertheless, whether “some portion of traditional
fiduciary duties [can] be preserved through the enforcement of good faith
duties”116 is a question that the Delaware courts have generally answered
in the negative. Therefore, if an LLC agreement eliminates fiduciary
duties, it is important to determine what types of conduct will or will not
violate the Implied Covenant in spite of this elimination. In order to make
this determination, an analysis of the relationship between fiduciary duties
and the Implied Covenant is critical.
There are a number of approaches to fiduciary duties in the alternative
entities. The fiduciary duties of care and loyalty can be mandatory, or
these duties can be treated as defaults that can be altered but not
eliminated.117 Alternatively, a more contract-based approach treats the
duties of loyalty and care as fiduciary defaults that can be altered or
111 Wilgus v. Salt Pond Inv. Co., 498 A.2d 151, 159 (Del. Ch. 1985) (interpreting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981)).
112 DeMott, supra note 45, at 879; Summers, supra note 102, at 827. R
113 See discussion supra Part II.A.
114 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1654 (1989); Manesh, supra note 6, at 244. R
115 See Gold, supra note 108, at 135 (emphasizing the importance of context in defining contractual good R
faith obligations).
116 Id. at 126.
117 E.g., N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417 (McKinney 2011) (allowing for alteration, but not
elimination, of fiduciary duties); see Miller, supra note 12, at 732–33; Miller, supra note 30, at 600 (noting that “a R
significant number of states now prevent the elimination of fiduciary duties”); see also Gotham Partners, L.P. v.
Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160 (Del. 2002) (taking this approach prior to the 2004 DLLCA
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eliminated.118 Delaware takes this latter approach. A Delaware court will
presume that “traditional” fiduciary duties of loyalty and care will govern
the relationship between the parties unless the parties’ agreement provides
otherwise.119
Before parties contemplate a fiduciary opt-out, however, it is critical
that they consider the types of conduct that might breach the Implied
Covenant. As a general matter, to successfully argue that the defendant
breached the Implied Covenant, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
acted in bad faith by conducting themselves “arbitrarily or unreasonably”
such that the plaintiff was prevented from reaping the benefits of the
contract.120 For example, courts have found that bad faith conduct
includes “evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking
off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to
specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other
party’s performance.”121
Given this basic landscape, a few observations can be made regarding
the Implied Covenant as it relates to fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties and
the Implied Covenant are close relatives.122 After all, “both types of duties
seek to prevent opportunism where a contract is silent,” and can therefore
be characterized as mere “variations on a theme.”123 However, what
differentiates fiduciary duties from the Implied Covenant is their scope of
amendment); supra text accompanying notes 89–99 (discussing Gotham and the 2004 amendment in greater R
detail).
118 Miller, supra note 12, at 732–33. A more extreme contractarian view (yet to be adopted by the R
courts) assumes that the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care are not defaults at all, but rather must be affirmatively
contracted for by the parties. Id. at 733.
119 Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, 40 A.3d 839, 853 (Del. Ch. 2012); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, § 18-1101 (2005). The contractual elimination of fiduciary duties, known as “fiduciary waiver” or “fiduciary
opt-out,” is subject to a fairly high standard of review by the Delaware courts. See, e.g., R.S.M. Inc. v. Alliance
Capital Mgmt. Holdings, 790 A.2d 478, 497 (Del. Ch. 2001) (noting that fiduciary waiver will be judicially
recognized only in circumstances when a contract clearly disclaims the applicability of fiduciary defaults, and the
court’s application of these defaults “would intrude upon the contractual rights or expectations” of the parties).
120 Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1126 (Del. 2010).
121 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981); see, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) (suggesting that willful abdication of corporate responsibilities is
indicative of bad faith).
122 Gale v. Bershad, No. CIV. A. 15714, 1998 WL 118022, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 1998) (“The
function of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in defining the duties of parties to a contract, is
analogous to the role of fiduciary law . . . .”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 426–27 (“A fiduciary R
relation is a contractual one . . . .”); see also id. at 438 (characterizing the relationship as nonlinear, but arguing that
the Implied Covenant best approximates the contours of fiduciary duties).
123 Gold, supra note 108, at 134; see also Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, R
909 (2011) (suggesting that good faith and fiduciary duty may be synonymous).
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application. At most, the Implied Covenant merely “binds the parties to
an agreement.”124 In contrast, a fiduciary is required to act affirmatively to
put the interests of the beneficiary ahead of his own interests, even if
neither individual’s interests were considered in an explicit contractual
reference.125 Moving from good faith and fair dealing towards fiduciary
duties, the relationship between the parties evolves from strictly
contractual to status-based, the applicable standard of conduct is raised,
and courts become more likely to impose liability.
Because the Implied Covenant exists in all contracts and cannot be
waived, the Covenant lies at the core of all contractual relationships. Even
statutes that allow for the modification or elimination of fiduciary duties
leave the Implied Covenant untouched. For example, DLLCA and
DRULPA allow the expansion and contraction of fiduciary duties
provided that the Implied Covenant is not eliminated.126 However, even
though the Implied Covenant is indispensable, it is narrower in scope than
are fiduciary duties, which encompass a broad notion of fairness
governing certain status relationships “characterized by unusually high
costs of specification and monitoring.”127 Further, it is easier to breach a
fiduciary duty than to breach the Implied Covenant.128 Fiduciary duties
often seek to prevent parties from placing their own interests ahead of the
interests of the individual or entity to whom the fiduciary duty is owed.129
In contrast, this is not the fundamental goal of the Implied Covenant.130
Rather, “the key question is abuse, not benefit to the actor.”131
124 Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., No. 5526–VCN, 2011 WL 4599654, at *11 (Del. Ch. Sept.
30, 2011).
125 See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399,
1409–10 (2002) (“In the fiduciary context, the duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to adjust her behavior on an
ongoing basis to avoid self-interested behavior that wrongs the beneficiary. By contrast, the implied obligation of
good faith and fair dealing requires loyalty to the other contracting party only to the extent that the terms of the
contractual relationship reasonably contemplate the actions in question.”).
126 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1101(c), 17-1101(d) (2005).
127 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 426–27. R
128 Gold, supra note 108, at 150; see Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, R
488 (2004) (“Good faith based liability . . . moves the bar from negligent behavior to deliberately indifferent,
egregious, subversive, or knowing behavior, and thereby raises issues related to the motives of the actors.”);
Christopher Hanno, Comment, The Other “F” Word: Fiduciary Duties, Fiduciary Waivers, and the Delaware Limited
Liability Company, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 101, 116 (2010) (noting that “the standard to find a breach of a covenant is
much higher than that of a fiduciary duty”).
129 Gold, supra note 108, at 135. Note that certain statutory schemes do not prohibit all self-interested R
behavior of fiduciaries. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(e)–(f) (1997).
130 Gold, supra note 108, at 135. R
131 DeMott, supra note 45, at 900. R
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Therefore, because fiduciary duties impose more exacting standards of
behavior, they are more easily breached. This suggests that fiduciary duties
lie on the outskirts of the Implied Covenant and are, therefore, more
“accessible” under the theory that “inequitable action does not become
permissible simply because it is legally possible.”132
B. The Nested-Sphere Model: A Way to Conceptualize the Relationship
Between the Implied Covenant and Fiduciary Duties
In light of the observations made above, this Article suggests building
a “nested-sphere” model—an analytical model of the relationship
between fiduciary duties and the Implied Covenant that interlocks these
two classes of obligations together. One can graphically represent this
model as a sphere within a sphere, where the Implied Covenant occupies
the innermost sphere, fiduciary duties occupy the outer sphere, and a
nearly infinite range of permissible conduct surrounds both spheres.133 In
a purely contractual relationship, the outer sphere of fiduciary duties is not
at issue, thereby expanding the scope of a party’s permissible conduct.
This means that although the inner core of good faith and fair dealing
always remains, it is somewhat more difficult to breach.
Nevertheless, when a party unilaterally attempts to recoup an
opportunity that was relinquished during contract formation, that party
may have breached the Implied Covenant.134 If a party breaches the inner
core of good faith, a court, in theory, should hold that party liable if the
contract suggests that, had the parties envisioned the breach, they would
have negotiated express terms covering the disputed conduct.135 If the
parties have a fiduciary relationship, any breach of the Implied Covenant
would theoretically satisfy the requirements of a breach of fiduciary duty
claim simultaneously.136 In other words, commonly cited conduct
constituting bad faith—for example, “evasion of the spirit of the bargain,
lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect
performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with or
132 Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
133 See infra app. A.
134 Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA
L. REV. 497, 499–500 (1984).
135 See Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 441 (Del. 2005).
136 See Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL 1124451,
at *5–8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) (the plaintiff asserted fiduciary and Covenant claims, but asserted the Covenant
claim “in the alternative” to the fiduciary claim).
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failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance”137—would breach
fiduciary duties, because all of these behaviors necessarily run counter to
the broad, external fairness norms that these duties seek to impose.138 In
spite of this overlap, the Covenant is designed to provide a separate avenue
of relief.139
Thus, the nested-sphere model sets the initial framework for
discussing a dispute involving fiduciary duties and the Implied Covenant.
In order to further clarify the Covenant’s role and application, the next
step is to determine how much territory the Covenant covers within the
nested sphere, as well as the effect, if any, of a fiduciary opt out on the
Covenant’s scope. This determination will assist in predicting the chances
of a plaintiff’s success on an Implied Covenant claim.
IV. REALITY IS MORE COMPLICATED THAN THEORY: THE
NESTED-SPHERE MODEL IN ACTION
At a minimum, the Implied Covenant cannot be used to revive or re-
strengthen fiduciary duties that were partially or completely relinquished
during contract negotiation.140 In addition, a plaintiff cannot bring a de
facto fiduciary duty action under the guise that the defendant breached
the Implied Covenant.141 These points are noncontroversial, and are
supported by the nested-sphere model.142
However, in Delaware, the joint operation of fiduciary duties and the
Implied Covenant is not as straightforward in practice as the nested-sphere
model would initially suggest. Two distinct patterns that alter the nested-
sphere model are apparent in Delaware. First, the Delaware courts have
given rise to a growing body of alternative-entity case law that mixes
contractualism143 with various external factors to account for the very
narrow initial scope of the Implied Covenant.144 Second, there are
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981).
138 See supra Part II (discussing the contours of fiduciary duties). For example, “lack of diligence and
slacking off” would likely give rise to duty of care claims, and “willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse
of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance” would
likely give rise to duty of loyalty claims. In addition, fiduciaries are presumably not allowed to breach contracts
with the beneficiaries of their fiduciary duties because this action would harm the beneficiary.
139 See Bay Ctr., 2009 WL 1124451, at *5.
140 E.g., In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28,
2010).
141 Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, 5 A.3d 1008, 1016 (Del. Ch. 2010).
142 See infra apps. A, C.
143 See supra Part III.B.2–3.
144 See infra Part IV.A–B; app. B.
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indications that, in situations where Delaware parties eliminate fiduciary
duties by contract, the scope of the Implied Covenant will be narrowed
even further, thereby rendering the Covenant functionally meaningless.145
The overall result of the courts’ hesitancy to trigger the Covenant is
that fiduciary duties and the Implied Covenant have essentially become a
“package deal”—neither obligation can apply without the other in
situations where fiduciary duties were originally available to regulate the
parties’ relationship: First, when fiduciary duties are maintained between
the parties, they necessarily operate in conjunction with the Covenant
given that the Covenant inheres in every contract.146 Second, because
contract claims based solely on the Implied Covenant are rarely successful,
and because Delaware has indicated that these claims would be deemed
superfluous if fiduciary duties have not been eliminated by the parties,147
the Implied Covenant has little to no significance as an independent
remedial tool.148
A. Incorporating Fairness, Contract, or Both?: The Role of Conflicting
Strands of Implied Covenant Analysis in Contributing to the
Covenant’s Narrow Initial Scope in Delaware
While it is clear is that the Implied Covenant is derived from the
notion that, in commercial dealings, a certain level of conduct should be
expected from the parties,149 what is not as clear is whether this level of
145 See infra Part IV.C; app. D.
146 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 114, at 1653–64. R
147 For example, the Delaware Chancery Court in Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, 5 A.3d 1008, 1018 (Del.
Ch. 2010) labeled fiduciary duties as “the most powerful of a court’s remedial and gap-filling powers.” Of course,
the Implied Covenant also serves as a contractual gap-filler. Therefore, it follows that in a situation in which
fiduciary duties have been retained in an agreement, an Implied Covenant claim arising from that agreement
would be deemed redundant.
148 See Gold, supra note 108, at 131 (arguing that, unless the Implied Covenant is deemed functionally R
separate from fiduciary duty, contracts eliminating fiduciary duties would be illusory and DLLCA’s Implied
Covenant provision would be rendered meaningless).
149 See Allied Capital Corp. v. GC–Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1032 (Del. Ch. 2006) (stating
that the Implied Covenant is the embodiment of a legal “expectation” (emphasis added)); J. William Callison &
Allan W. Vestal, “They’ve Created a Lamb with Mandibles of Death”: Secrecy, Disclosure, and Fiduciary Duties in
Limited Liability Firms, 76 IND. L.J. 271, 306 (2001) (“The law . . . establish[es] both socially appropriate default
rules and limits on party modifications of such default rules . . . assur[ing] that specific business organizations are
both socially appropriate and consistent with party and social expectations.”); cf. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1742–43
(2001) (arguing that fiduciary duties are important in signaling society’s expectation of trustworthiness to the
parties); Sandra Chutorian, Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 405 (1986)
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conduct should be established only through reference to the parties’
contract (thereby rendering the Covenant a tool for contract
interpretation), or whether this level of conduct should be set with any
reference to external fairness norms (thereby rendering the Covenant a
tool for governing the parties’ relationship). Whether a court chooses to
incorporate fairness considerations into its inquiry affects the initial scope
of the Covenant within the nested-sphere model—if fairness is
incorporated, the Covenant’s scope is wider than if the court does not
consider fairness because a fairness inquiry in a Covenant case would
necessarily align the Covenant more with the equitable objectives of
fiduciary duties.150
Because good faith comes into play in both the contractual and tort
contexts, the obligation takes on different characteristics accordingly. In
Delaware, there is authority supporting a fairness-tinged interpretation of
the Implied Covenant, and there is authority supporting a contractual
interpretation of the Covenant. Further, some of Delaware’s contract cases
confuse the issue by using language from Covenant cases in the tort
context, thereby conflating the contractual analysis of the Covenant with
the fairness inquiry of fiduciary duties.
1. Good Faith in the Tort Context.
In the tort context, many case-law inquiries into good faith and fair
dealing are concentrated in the insurance and employment arenas.151
Because tort law necessarily concerns the imposition of external standards
of equitable conduct,152 these cases naturally inquire into the fairness of
the defendant’s conduct in light of the special, or quasi-fiduciary
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.153 In contrast, in a
purely contractual good faith and fair dealing inquiry, only the parties’
contract should influence the outcome of the dispute.154
(“Although the duties implied under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing are derived from the particular
contract, they nonetheless reflect social standards of fair conduct . . . .”). See generally Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt,
and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1059, 1061–62 (2003) (discussing the power of law in compelling
parties to comply with social norms).
150 See supra Parts II, III.A (noting the role of fairness in fiduciary inquiries).
151 See Howard L. Fink, The Splintering of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Illinois
Courts, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 247, 249–55 (1999).
152 See generally David G. Owen, Expectations in Tort, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1287, 1311 (2011) (“[T]ort law is
and ought to be grounded in the fair expectations of actors, victims, and broader society.”).
153 See, e.g., Fink, supra note 172. R
154 See Daniel S. Kleinberger, Careful What You Wish for—Freedom of Contract and the Necessity of Careful
Scrivening, 24 PUBOGRAM 19, 19 (2006), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0054/
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While plaintiffs’ purely contractual Implied Covenant claims are rarely
successful,155 this is not the case in the tort arena. For example, in the
insurance tort context, the “special relationship” between the insurer and
the insured has given rise to liability under the Implied Covenant more
often than any other context156 because courts imply a high level of trust
into insurance contracts, and because the relationship between the parties
deemed “quasi-fiduciary.”157
Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. is illustrative of the tort-law
approach to the Implied Covenant. In Dunlap, after suffering injuries in a
car accident, the plaintiff sued her insurer, claiming that the insurer acted
in bad faith by refusing to guarantee that it would continue its coverage of
the plaintiff even if she settled with the alleged tortfeasor.158 State Farm
moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the trial
court granted the motion.159
In the prelude to its partial reversal, the Delaware Supreme Court
outlined the 300-plus year history of the Implied Covenant in the
insurance context.160 Characterizing the application of the Covenant as
“quasi-reformation,” the court emphasized that such an application
“governed solely by issues of compelling fairness.”161 The question in
Dunlap was whether or not such issues existed.
The court concluded that the plaintiff may have had a cognizable
Implied Covenant claim.162 Interestingly, the court rejected the notion
that a finding of lack of good faith on the part of the defendant necessarily
meant that the defendant acted in bad faith.163 Rather, a lack of good faith
encompassed a broader range of conduct, according to the Dunlap
court.164 If State Farm had simply improperly failed or refused to pay the
plaintiff’s insurance claim, this conduct would have constituted bad
materials/pp7.pdf (“[W]here contract is deity, you shall know the fruit [of the bargain] by reading narrowly the
words of the contract.”).
155 See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
156 Phillips, supra note 101, at 1210. R
157 See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Cal. 1973); see also Phillips, supra note
101, at 1210; supra text accompanying notes 21–23 (noting the role of trust in the concept of fiduciary duties). R
158 Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 437 (Del. 2005).
159 Id. at 438.
160 Id. at 440–41.
161 Id. at 442 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162 Id. at 445.
163 Id. at 442.
164 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIB\21-1\MIB102.txt unknown Seq: 26 26-MAR-13 9:48
136 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:111
faith.165 However, because the conduct in question was State Farm’s
failure to pay in reliance on a provision in the insurance contract requiring
the plaintiff to exhaust remedies provided in other insurance policies
before obtaining underinsurance benefits from State Farm,166 a pure bad
faith analysis would not have covered State Farm’s conduct.167
Nevertheless, in the court’s view, State Farm’s actions could have fallen
within the Implied Covenant’s boundaries under a “lack of good faith”
analysis.168 Therefore, the court reversed the lower court’s granting of
State Farm’s motion to dismiss and remanded on the question of whether
State Farm violated the Implied Covenant.169
2. Good Faith in the Contractual Context.
In contrast with the tort-law approach to the Implied Covenant, the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank
is illustrative of a purely contractual conception of the Implied Covenant
(i.e., one that does not consider external notions of fairness to resolve the
dispute).170 In that case, the debtor (a shoe corporation) and a bank
entered into a loan agreement that established a $300,000 line of credit
and allowed creditors to draw on letters of credit.171 When the debtor
entered bankruptcy, creditors began drawing on the letters of credit and
the debtor failed to repay the bank in full.172 Subsequently, the bank
discontinued all advances to the debtor.173 Under a fourth plan of
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor
proposed that the bank be demoted to unsecured creditor status.174 The
bankruptcy judge confirmed the proposed plan under the theory that the
bank’s conduct was inequitable.175
The Seventh Circuit vacated the bankruptcy court’s decision.176 Judge
Easterbrook delivered the opinion of the court, and his contractarian
165 Id.
166 Id. at 437.
167 Id. at 442.
168 Id. at 442–43.
169 Id. at 445.
170 Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990).
171 Id. at 1353–54.




176 Id. at 1363.
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philosophy was apparent:177
“Good faith” is a compact reference to an implied undertaking not
to take opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been
contemplated at the time of drafting, and which therefore was not
resolved explicitly by the parties. When the contract is silent,
principles of good faith—such as the UCC’s standard of honesty
in fact and the reasonable expectations of the trade . . . —fill the
gap. They do not block use of terms that actually appear in the
contract.178
When tort claims are not at issue, Kham makes the Covenant’s role
clear. It is merely a contractual gap-filler, where the contract itself controls
whether a court can locate gaps in the first place. Further, Judge
Easterbrook’s reference to good faith as “compact” reinforces the notion
that good faith is conceptually narrower than fiduciary duty. The
philosophy of Judge Posner, Judge Easterbrook’s colleague on the Seventh
Circuit, further supports this idea: “Contract law does not require parties
to behave altruistically toward each other; it does not proceed on the
philosophy that I am my brother’s keeper. That philosophy may animate
the law of fiduciary obligations but parties to a contract are not each
other’s fiduciaries.”179
3. Delaware’s Contractual Approach to the Implied Covenant as
Influenced by Tort-Law Precedent.
The approach of the Delaware courts is similar to that of the Kham
court.180 Because Delaware’s alternative-entity statutes explicitly label the
Implied Covenant as “contractual” in nature,181 Delaware courts have
taken a contractualist tack, emphasizing that the Implied Covenant is not a
“free-floating duty unattached to the underlying legal documents,” and
that the Covenant is “best understood as a way of implying terms in [an]
177 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 427 (“Fiduciary duties . . . are the same sort of R
obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings.”).
178 Kham, 908 F.2d at 1357 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
179 Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 280
(7th Cir. 1992).
180 See Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 441 n.22 (Del. 2005). See generally
Kleinberger, supra note 154. R
181 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2005). In contrast, the Uniform Acts do not explicitly
label the Implied Covenant as contractual.
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agreement.”182 In other words, independent fairness considerations play
no role.
However, even though Delaware’s overall approach to the Implied
Covenant is contractual, some Delaware cases addressing the contractual
Implied Covenant have imported language from good faith and fair
dealing cases in the tort context, and this language often references
external notions of fairness. For example, multiple non-tort cases in
Delaware have cited Dunlap (or similar cases) for the proposition that
Implied Covenant cases should be governed solely by “issues of
compelling fairness.”183 However, the use of this tort language is highly
problematic in the contractual setting: If a court believes that the Implied
Covenant should not involve fairness considerations, then the use of
language from tort cases (that consider fairness) as a standard against which
the parties’ conduct should be evaluated necessarily hinders a plaintiff’s
ability to succeed on a purely contractual claim based on the Covenant.
This approach may also cause courts to permanently associate the
Covenant with tort- or fiduciary duty-like fairness inquiries, leading to
increased hesitancy to trigger the Covenant, especially when parties
contractually eliminate fiduciary duties.184
B. Examining Delaware Precedent to Further Explain the Implied
Covenant’s Narrow Scope
Even though Delaware courts often claim to merely extrapolate from
the spirit of the contract when deciding whether to imply a covenant into
a contract,185 in reality, their Implied Covenant analyses do not always
strictly interpret the contents of the parties’ contract. Rather, Delaware
courts also appear to use a combination of contractual, relational, and
motivational factors to place these contracts in context, and to reduce the
territory that the Implied Covenant can cover.186 These factors can be
used to organize relevant case law and to obtain a better understanding of
182 Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, 5 A.3d 1008, 1017 (2010) (quoting Dunlap, 878 A.2d at 441) (internal
quotation marks omitted). This strict contractual approach is likely attributable to the stark change of direction
imposed on the courts by the Delaware legislature in the wake of Gotham. See supra text accompanying notes
89–99. R
183 E.g., Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1126 n.16 (Del. 2010); Lonergan, 5 A.3d at 1018; In re
Broadstripe, LLC, 435 B.R. 245, 263 & n.73 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).
184 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
185 See, e.g., Kelly v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 99C-09-265 WCC, 2002 WL 88939, at *10 (Del.
Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2002).
186 See infra app. B.
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the reasoning behind the Delaware’s narrow reading of the Implied
Covenant.
1. Sophistication of the Parties.
Among the nuanced factors that differentiate one Implied Covenant
case from another, the sophistication of the parties arguably plays the
biggest role. A general guideline emerges: The more sophisticated the
parties are, the less likely they are to prevail under an Implied Covenant
theory because sophisticated parties will theoretically have difficulty
arguing that a court should imply one or more terms into a contract that
appears to have been designed to cover all reasonably foreseeable
contingencies.187
To shed light on this generalization, it helps to revisit the cases that
influenced Delaware’s Implied Covenant jurisprudence. Many of the cases
that jumpstarted Delaware’s conception of the Implied Covenant
addressed disputes in the employment and insurance contexts—arenas in
which courts deem a “special relationship” to exist between the parties.188
These relationships are marked by inherently unequal bargaining power,
and this inequality provides a convenient basis for triggering the Implied
Covenant.189 However, when equally-sophisticated parties negotiate an
agreement on mutually-agreeable terms, no such inequality is presumed
to exist, meaning that a plaintiff’s Implied Covenant claim is less likely to
succeed.
This principle was illustrated in Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap,
LP.190 In that case, Squid Soap, counseled by Vinson & Elkins, and
Airborne, counseled by Weil, Gotshal & Manges, entered into an asset
purchase agreement providing for potential earn-out payments to Squid
Soap under which Airborne agreed to purchase $1 million of Squid Soap’s
assets, Squid Soap’s brand name, goodwill and intellectual property upon
the achievement of certain sales and marketing goals.191 The agreement
obligated Airborne to transfer the purchased assets back to Squid Soap if
Airborne stopped selling or marketing Squid Soap products at any time, or
did not incur $1 million in advertising and marketing costs and obtain $5
187 See, e.g., Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL
1124451, at *7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009).
188 See Steele, supra note 88, at 14–15. R
189 James Mabry Vickery, Note, A Special Relationship: The Use of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
to Impose Tort Damages in Contracts Between Lender and Borrower, 9 REV. LITIG. 93, 95–96, 125–26 (1990).
190 Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984 A.2d 126, 145–46 (Del. Ch. 2009).
191 Id. at 132.
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million in net sales of Squid Soap products.192
After the agreement was signed, Airborne failed to meet these
benchmarks and suffered significant setbacks with respect to its consumer
credibility including a class action lawsuit. Squid Soap learned of the
pending class action and claimed that Airborne and Weil were aware of
the lawsuit at the time Airborne signed the agreement with Squid Soap.193
As part of its “damage control” efforts, Airborne sought to return the
purchased assets to Squid Soap.194 However, Squid Soap refused to accept
the assets.195
When Airborne sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable
under the asset purchase agreement, Squid Soap counterclaimed against
Airborne under a variety of theories, including the Implied Covenant.196
Its Implied Covenant claim centered on Airborne’s failure to disclose the
pending lawsuit against it to Squid Soap, and Airborne’s failure to meet
the marketing, advertising, and sales targets set forth in the agreement.197
However, the Delaware Chancery Court swiftly rejected Squid Soap’s
Covenant claim. Characterizing this claim as a “fall[ ] back” that merely
“recast[ ] . . . Squid Soap’s basic complaints,” the court reasoned that the
Implied Covenant would not apply to impose liability on Airborne
because the asset purchase agreement expressly covered the subject of the
dispute—namely, the marketing, advertising, and sales goals, and
Airborne’s representation regarding litigation.198 However, the court
conceded that “Squid Soap understandably question[ed] what it obtained
under the [asset purchase agreement] if Airborne had no obligation
actually to expend resources” under the agreement’s marketing and
advertising provisions.199
If there ever was an agreement that would presumably fit within the
Implied Covenant’s specific criteria, it was the Airborne–Squid Soap
agreement. First, the provisions of the agreement setting forth the specific
targets that Airborne would have to meet in order to retain the Squid
Soap assets provided a basis for gleaning and interpreting the parties’
intentions. By signing the agreement, was Squid Soap implicitly agreeing
192 Id.
193 Id. at 134.
194 Id. at 135.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 136.
197 Id. at 145.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 146.
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that Airborne could arbitrarily fail to promote Squid Soap’s products and
deny Squid Soap the earn-out payments? Squid Soap argued, reasonably,
that it did not.200 Second, the Implied Covenant does not apply if the
agreement addresses the subject of the dispute. Here, the agreement did
not address the subject of the dispute because it did not obligate Airborne
to expend resources to market Squid Soap’s products.201 The question was
whether the court could—or would be willing to—imply a covenant by
finding a strong enough connection between the agreement’s explicit
provisions and its lack of clarity regarding Airborne’s role in executing
these provisions.
Under the plain language of the agreement, Airborne had complete
discretion to either expend or fail to expend its resources for the benefit of
Squid Soap. Airborne was not under an explicit obligation to expend
resources. Rather, it had the option to return the assets to Squid Soap if it
chose not to market Squid Soap’s products; Airborne attempted to
exercise this option in lieu of marketing the assets. However, in
discretion-type cases, the party exercising discretion must not do so in bad
faith or arbitrarily to the detriment of the other party. The Airborne court
recognized that this principle has support in Delaware law.202 Squid Soap
may have had a plausible argument that Airborne acted in bad faith by
failing to market the products simply because it was in the midst of a
corporate crisis and it wanted to conserve its resources. However, the
court contended that Squid Soap mistakenly failed to specifically allege
bad faith or arbitrariness on Airborne’s part.203
Certainly, Squid Soap did not bring its strongest case to court.
However, the facts and the merits of the court’s holding in Airborne are
less important than the reasoning behind the holding. The court’s
characterization of Squid Soap as a sophisticated party was key:
Squid Soap’s position is also undercut by the ease with which
Squid Soap could have insisted on specific contractual
commitments from Airborne regarding the expenditure of
resources, or some form of “efforts” obligation for Airborne.
These provisions are familiar to any transactional lawyer, and
Squid Soap was a sophisticated party represented by able counsel. . . .
Squid Soap could have insisted on a provision binding Airborne.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 146–47.
203 Id. at 147.
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Rather than holding out for these types of contractual protections,
Squid Soap accepted earn-out provisions that [were] expressly
phrased in conditional terms.204
The court characterized the agreement as a reasonable contract that
just happened to sour due to Airborne’s business difficulties.205 In the
court’s view, this was a risk that was willingly assumed by Squid Soap.206
Therefore, the court did not view the facts presented as an appropriate
context in which to consider the Implied Covenant.207 The alternative,
contractarian argument would be that the court actually considered the
Implied Covenant, but found that it had not been breached because the
conduct in question did not violate the spirit of the agreement. However,
when a court acts to define the spirit of the agreement by reference to one
or more characteristics of the parties, an Airborne-type result is virtually
inevitable because, in theory, sophisticated parties should be capable of
drafting contracts that are substantially “complete.”
On one hand, the court made some plausible arguments—namely,
that it would have been easy enough to draft an agreement that specifically
obligated Airborne to expend resources, and that it was not for the court
to intervene after-the-fact to save Squid Soap from a rational contract that
was later affected by unforeseen business downturns. On the other hand,
the court’s language begs the question: When the Implied Covenant is
relevant in a certain situation, isn’t it usually the case that the parties could
have included the disputed matter in their contract on explicit terms?
Further, didn’t Squid Soap have a reasonable expectation that Airborne
would actually expend resources in furtherance of the contract? It cannot
be reasonably contended that Squid Soap entered into the agreement for
the eventual return of its assets. Rather, it entered into the agreement to
earn money, the bulk of which was to come from the earn-out when
Airborne met the targets stipulated in the agreement.
The court’s emphasis on the sophistication of Squid Soap cuts both
ways. Certainly, Squid Soap may have intended to agree to whatever was
explicitly included in the contract—no more, and no less. However,
perhaps it was precisely because Squid Soap was a sophisticated party that it
assumed that the language of the agreement would be sufficient to induce
Airborne to expend resources. If the latter is true, then the agreement
204 Id. (emphasis added).
205 Id. at 147–48.
206 Id. at 147.
207 Id.
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would arguably come within the Implied Covenant’s “narrow band”
under the theory that Airborne’s “duty” to expend resources and to make
a good faith effort to market was consistent with the “purposes reflected
in the express language of the contract.”208
The influence of the “sophisticated parties” factor on the court’s
analysis severely limits the general effectiveness of the Implied Covenant in
cases where a court deems that one or more parties “should have known”
to draft a more thorough, dispute-preventing agreement. The logic seems
to unfold in the following way: (1) The Implied Covenant operates
“where the contract as a whole speaks sufficiently to suggest an obligation
and point to a result, but does not speak directly enough to provide an
explicit answer.”209 (2) The Implied Covenant applies only when it is
“clear from what was expressly agreed upon that the parties who
negotiated the express terms of the contract would have agreed to
proscribe the act later complained of as a breach . . . had they thought to
negotiate with respect to that matter.”210 (3) Sophisticated parties are more
likely to negotiate matters thoroughly than non-sophisticated parties. (4)
Courts should be hesitant about implying contractual protections,
especially “when the contract easily could have been drafted to expressly
provide for [these protections].”211 (5) If the parties are sophisticated,
then they are more likely to be aware of the obligations that should be
included in the agreement to protect their contractual expectations. (6) If
certain obligations are not included in the agreement, then it is more
likely than not that the parties, being sophisticated, did not intend for
these obligations to attach at the time the agreement was signed.
Although the court did not view the Airborne–Squid Soap agreement
as “irrational” or “unreasonable,” the outcome of the case itself suggests
that the contract was risky at best and unwise at worst, especially for a
party represented by reputable counsel. And, as Delaware cases have
shown, Delaware courts will not intervene to mitigate the consequences
of entering into unwise contracts.212
Allied Capital Corp. v. GC–Sun Holdings, L.P.213 provides another
208 Id. at 146 (quoting Alliance Data Sys. Corp. v. Blackstone Capital Partners V L.P., 963 A.2d 746, 770
(Del. Ch.), aff’d, 976 A.2d 170 (Del. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
209 Id.
210 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880
(Del. Ch. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
211 Id. (quoting Allied Capital Corp. v. GC–Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1035 (Del. Ch. 2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
212 See Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1128 (Del. 2010).
213 Allied Capital, 910 A.2d 1020.
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example of the “sophisticated party” factor in action. In that case, Allied
sued GC (among other defendants), a limited partnership and one of
Allied’s debtors, to collect on a promissory note.214 Allied claimed that,
although the limited partnership itself was insolvent, it could have repaid
Allied had GC’s general partner refrained from subordinating Allied’s
claim on the promissory note to a new equity investment made by an
affiliate of the general partner.215 In what the Delaware Chancery Court
termed “a jurisprudentially-intergalactic campaign to recover on the
note,” Allied brought no fewer than eight causes of action, including a
claim for breach of the Implied Covenant, against a myriad of directly and
remotely connected defendants.216
The defendants successfully moved to dismiss.217 Faulting Allied for
failing to secure certain substantive rights during the negotiation process,
the court brushed off Allied’s Implied Covenant claim as “another in a
long line of [unsuccessful Covenant] cases”218 in which plaintiffs attempt
to make up for the consequences of certain contract drafting deficiencies.
Allied alleged that it had been robbed of the fruits of the contract
(repayment on the promissory note) because it had a reasonable
expectation that no investments by the defendants would take priority
over the note.219 Allied’s case was not helped by the fact that the
promissory note explicitly forbade certain types of investments, but did
not restrict the type of investment giving rise to Allied’s claim.220
However, Allied may have had a cognizable argument based on its
reasonable expectations. Allied argued that because the agreement
prohibited unsubordinated debt investments, the agreement implied that
unsubordinated equity investments (the type of investment made by the
defendants) were also prohibited because otherwise, Allied would not
have had any meaningful protection against “intentional evasions” of the
debt-investment restriction.221 In other words, Allied relied on the
implication that, because “equity by its very nature has a lower priority
than debt,” the debt-investment restriction was the practical equivalent of
an equity-investment restriction.222
214 Id. at 1023.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 1023–24.
217 Id. at 1045.
218 Id. at 1024.
219 Id. at 1032.
220 Id. at 1024.
221 Id. at 1032.
222 Id. at 1031.
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While it is unclear whether this argument would have withstood
court scrutiny had the parties been unseasoned, it is clear that the fact that
the sophistication of Allied and GP played a role in the court’s rejection of
Allied’s Implied Covenant claim. Premising its analysis on the fact that the
Implied Covenant is “intrinsically counterfactual and [prone to]
hindsight-bias,” the court was unwilling to give Allied the benefit of the
doubt because it had ample opportunity to negotiate for explicit
contractual protections. One clear sign of the court’s lack of sympathy was
its citation to Shenandoah Life Insurance Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 1988
WL 63491, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1988)—another case involving
sophisticated business entities—for the proposition that where “a specific,
negotiated provision [like the debt-investment restriction] directly treats
the subject of the alleged wrong and has been found to have not been
violated, it is quite unlikely that a court will find by implication [that] a
contractual obligation of a different kind [like an obligation to refrain
from equity investments] . . . has been breached.”223
However, the “sophisticated party” analysis can be troublesome in the
alternative-entity context. A court may assume that because the parties
chose an alternative-entity structure for their enterprise, the parties are
necessarily sophisticated.224 This assumption was illustrated by the
Delaware Chancery Court’s language in Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W
Acquisition LLC: “In the alternative entity context[,] . . . it is more likely
that sophisticated parties have carefully negotiated the governing
agreement . . . .”225 Courts may improperly assume sophistication among
parties in alternative entities because these entities are riskier structures
compared to the more “traditional” corporate and partnership forms
which are supported by larger bodies of judicial precedent.226 However,
empirical evidence does not support this assumption of sophistication—
the vast majority of LLCs are created without much negotiation by parties
that are not necessarily skilled contract drafters.227
Would the outcome in Airborne have changed if the parties had not
been sophisticated and represented by counsel from two top-notch law
223 Id. at 1033 n.25.
224 See Clancy v. King, 954 A.2d 1092, 1100 n.14 (Md. 2008) (“Limited partnership agreements are
more likely to be the result of extensive arm’s-length negotiations and thus involve business venturers in a better
position to bargain for various terms . . . .”); see also id. (“The fact that the present case deals with a limited
partnership rather than a corporation provides even greater reason to defer [solely] to the provisions of the
various contracts.”).
225 Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1063 (Del. Ch. 2006).
226 See Sale, supra note 128, at 457 (calling Delaware the “mother of all corporate law” jurisdictions). R
227 See Hanno, supra note 128, at 113–14. R
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firms? Clancy v. King involved a partnership dispute between divorcing
spouses.228 Although Clancy is a Maryland Supreme Court case, it
provides some useful insight regarding how a Delaware court might
approach an Implied Covenant case in which the litigants are individuals
rather than business entities.229 Clancy, a successful author, and his wife,
King, each held a 1% general partnership interest and a 49% limited
partnership interest in their book-franchise limited partnership.230 While
the parties were still married, King obtained the right to manage the
limited partnership through a court order.231 The partnership then
entered into a joint venture and the joint venture acquired the rights to
convert Clancy’s books into a television show and a series of paperback
books.232
The joint venture agreement stated that key decisions regarding the
“development, use and exploitation” of the television show proposal
would be made by Clancy and a third party, but that if they failed to
agree, Clancy’s decision would control.233 When Clancy and King
divorced, a marital property agreement was incorporated into the divorce
decree.234 This agreement stated that Clancy would be the managing
partner of the limited partnership, and that he would have the right to
enter into contracts to exploit the literary assets of the joint venture.235
After Clancy and King’s divorce was finalized, Clancy revoked his
permission to the joint venture to use his name in marketing future
books.236 As a result, the limited partnership’s share of the joint venture’s
profits plummeted from 75% to 25%, thereby proportionately affecting
King’s interest in the limited partnership.237 King sued Clancy, alleging
breach of fiduciary duty.238 While the trial and intermediate appellate
courts ruled in King’s favor, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed.239
228 Clancy, 954 A.2d at 1095.
229 Maryland’s approach is similar to Delaware’s contractual approach to the Covenant when fiduciary
duties have been modified. See id. at 1100–01. Further, the Clancy court cited multiple Delaware cases throughout
its analysis. See generally id. at 1092–1115.
230 Id. at 1095.
231 Id. at 1099.
232 Id. at 1095 & n.3.
233 Id. at 1096 & n.6.
234 Id. at 1096 & n.5.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 1097.
237 Id. at 1097 n.8.
238 Id. at 1097.
239 Id. at 1111.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIB\21-1\MIB102.txt unknown Seq: 37 26-MAR-13 9:48
2013] LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 147
Like the Delaware courts, the court of appeals heavily focused its
attention on the role of the limited partnership agreement and the joint
venture agreement in governing the relationship between the parties, and
largely disregarded the role of fiduciary duties. In the court’s view,
fiduciary duties had been modified by the portions of the limited
partnership agreement allowing the partners to compete with the
partnership, and by the portions of the joint venture agreement giving
Clancy final decisionmaking authority—provisions “that otherwise would
be flagrant violations of common law and statutory fiduciary duties.”240
However, the next step in the court’s analysis was to view Clancy’s
conduct through the lens of the Implied Covenant. The court emphasized
that Clancy had an obligation to exercise his discretion in good faith,241
and cited multiple cases standing for the proposition that the Implied
Covenant assumes even greater importance in the context of discretionary
decisionmaking.242 The issue was whether Clancy’s decision to withdraw
permission to use his name was made in bad faith. The court stated that
“[a] general or managing partner acts in bad faith where the primary
motivation of his or her conduct is to injure either the firm/venture or his
or her business partners.”243 While conceding that, as an artist, Clancy
had the right to “seek to retain creative control over a project that bore his
. . . name,”244 the court ultimately found that Clancy owed a duty of
good faith, apart from fiduciary duties.245
Although Clancy appears to lend more significance to the Implied
Covenant than Delaware cases, this case does not necessarily provide a
complete template for Delaware. For example, Clancy differs from Airborne
because in Clancy, King did not have a real opportunity to prevent the
arbitrary exercise of Clancy’s discretion. Clancy’s discretion could not
have been subject to an “efforts” obligation—either Clancy would
continue to grant permission to use his name or he would not. In
contrast, Squid Soap could have obligated Airborne to either expend a
certain amount of its resources in marketing Squid Soap’s products, or
make a good-faith effort to market and advertise before returning the
purchased assets to Squid Soap.246 And, whereas the parties in Allied could
240 Id. at 1102 n.18.
241 Id. at 1106.
242 Id. at 1107.
243 Id. at 1108.
244 Id. at 1106.
245 Id. at 1110. The case was remanded to determine whether Clancy had acted in good faith. Id.
246 But see Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95
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have drafted an express provision prohibiting equity investments, parties
like those in Clancy are not likely to include an express provision
prohibiting the arbitrary exercise of discretion, given that discretely
defining “arbitrary” conduct in a contract would be impractical and
would leave parties free to engage in potentially arbitrary conduct that was
not explicitly listed.
Clancy also differs from Airborne and Allied because Squid Soap,
Airborne, Allied and GC were sophisticated business entities that had
ample opportunity to negotiate for contractual protections at arm’s
length, whereas Clancy and King were individuals whose contractual
relationship was intertwined with their disintegrating personal
relationship, thereby giving Clancy a motive to harm King financially. In
this respect, motivational considerations provide an independent basis for
Implied Covenant analyses.
2. Motives.
The motive underlying the actions giving rise to the complaining
party’s claim plays a role in the outcome of Implied Covenant disputes. As
a general matter, if the plaintiff can demonstrate (or even just suggest) that
the defendant’s actions were spiteful or malicious, the plaintiff is more
likely to prevail on his Implied Covenant claim.247 In contrast, if the
defendant simply took an action that fell within the bounds of the
agreement, or if the plaintiff’s injury was merely a consequence of the
plaintiff’s entry into a “bad” contract, the plaintiff is less likely to prevail
on his Implied Covenant claim.248
For example, the general implication in Clancy was that the timing of
Clancy’s withdrawal—after divorce proceedings—was indicative of
Clancy’s potential bad faith and desire to harm King by reducing her
profit share:
If a significant motive for Clancy exercising his contractual
right to withdraw his name from the Op–Center series was to
NW. U. L. REV. 91, 120 (2000) (noting that “best efforts” obligations are not only vague, but also pose the risk of
the judicial imposition of less-than-ideal terms).
247 See, e.g., Clancy, 954 A.2d at 1108 (citing Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity
Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199 (Del. 1993)).
248 For example, in Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017–CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *10–11 (Del. Ch.
May 7, 2008), aff’d, 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009), the plaintiff essentially alleged that the mere exercise of a
contractual right violated the Implied Covenant. This claim was swiftly rejected by the court. Id. at *11; see also
infra Part IV.C (discussing Fisk in greater detail).
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decrease the profitability of the series, thereby denying his JRLP
partner and ex-wife revenue, because he desired to spite or punish
King for or as a consequence of their divorce, it reasonably could
be maintained that he acted in bad faith towards both the
Op–Center Joint Venture and JRLP. One certainly breaches the
promise of good faith owed in contract and as fiduciary in a
partnership by working actively to decrease directly the profits of
the business venture.249
The deteriorating marital relationship between the parties in Clancy
clearly had an influence on the lens through which the court evaluated
Clancy’s conduct because Clancy had a personal motive to harm the
plaintiff.250 In this vein, the plaintiff is more likely to prevail under an
Implied Covenant theory if he can support the conclusion that the
contract must be interpreted more liberally to adequately protect the
plaintiff—such as when the defendant has engaged in some egregious
conduct that is far outside the bounds of the agreement. However, this is
an extremely high bar for the plaintiff to meet.251
Delaware courts view a defendant’s conduct as arbitrary,
unreasonable, or egregious, and therefore in violation of the Implied
Covenant, when “the other contracting party is thereby disadvantaged and
no legitimate interest of the party exercising the right is furthered by
doing so.”252 In other words, if a plaintiff can only show that he was
injured by the defendant’s conduct, this will not necessarily persuade a
Delaware court to imply contractual protections. This is a major
disadvantage of the Implied Covenant when it stands unaccompanied by
fiduciary duties. Unlike in the fiduciary duty context, the Implied
Covenant allows a fairly full range of self-interested behavior.253
Therefore, the “no legitimate interest” prong is necessary to differentiate
permissible and impermissible conduct under the Covenant. If the
defendant’s conduct disadvantages the plaintiff but helps the defendant in
249 Clancy, 954 A.2d at 1109.
250 See Sale, supra note 128, at 488 (positing that good faith inquiries necessarily raise issues regarding the R
parties’ motives).
251 See Gold, supra note 108, at 127–28 (“[B]arring egregious cases, such as unconscionability, fraud, or R
misappropriation of assets, contract doctrine mandates few restrictions on the discretion of nonfiduciaries.”).
252 Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1134 (Del. 2010) (emphasis added).
253 See Ribstein, supra note 123, at 909 (“In contrast to fiduciary duties, the implied covenant enables R
contracting parties to act selfishly as long as this conduct is at least broadly consistent with the parties’ ex ante
expectations based on the contract.”).
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the process, then the defendant’s actions are presumably reasonable.254 It is
only when the defendant disadvantages the plaintiff and does not
legitimately benefit the defendant in the process that the court will
consider getting involved under a narrow conception of the Implied
Covenant. For example, in Clancy, the defendant’s refusal to allow his
name to continue to be used not only reduced the plaintiff’s share of
distributions, but it also impaired the general success of the business while
failing to render any apparent benefit to the defendant.
3. Complexity of the Agreement or Governance Scheme.
Another important factor that can be gleaned from Implied Covenant
decisions is the nature of the agreement or the structure that is sought to
be established by the agreement. If either of these elements is particularly
complex, the complaining party is less likely to prevail under an Implied
Covenant theory. According to the Delaware Chancery Court, “Delaware
courts rightly employ the implied covenant sparingly when parties have
crafted detailed, complex agreements, lest parties be stuck by judicial error
with duties they never voluntarily accepted.”255
For example, Lonergan v. EPE Holdings LLC addressed an Implied
Covenant claim in a class action brought by a unitholder in a master
limited partnership (“MLP”).256 The plaintiff challenged a proposed
merger between Enterprise GP Holdings (“Holdings”) and Enterprise
Products Partners L.P. (“Partners”) because Holdings was the sole owner
of Partners’ general partner.257 For this reason, the plaintiff alleged
conflicts of interest and certain disclosure violations.258
Holdings and Partners were both MLPs, creating a two-tiered
structure in which (1) Partners’ distributions would trigger Holdings’
254 For example, see Nemec, 991 A.2d at 1127–28, where the court opted to avoid “moral questions”
based on the appearance of the defendant’s actions, and stated that the “directors made a rational business
judgment to exercise the Company’s contractual right for the $60 million benefit.” Notably, this language is
similar to that found in cases applying the business judgment rule—a standard of review that is used in breach of
fiduciary duty cases. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. However, the Nemec court had already R
foreclosed the application of fiduciary duties because the plaintiff’s claim arose from the contractual right to
redeem. See Nemec, 991 A.2d at 1129. This is another example of Delaware’s reversion to fiduciary duty principles
in contractual inquiries. See also supra text accompanying notes 89–99. R
255 Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL 1124451, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009); cf. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 655 (Del. Ch. 2008) (listing the
defendant’s hiring of “reputable advisors” as a factor in denying fiduciary liability).
256 Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, 5 A.3d 1008, 1011 (Del. Ch. 2010).
257 Id.
258 Id.
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incentive distribution rights (“IDRs”) and generate a certain percentage
of Partners’ distributions as cash for Holdings, and (2) Holdings would
then distribute this cash to its unitholders.259 Because the IDRs were
directly linked to the performance of Partners, Holdings had an incentive
to manage Partners in a way that would increase the cash available for
distribution to Holdings’ unitholders and attract investors.260
The complexity of the facts underlying the plaintiff’s claim was not
lost on the Delaware Chancery Court. According to the court, the two-
tiered Holdings–Partners structure “create[d] a web of conflicts” that
Holdings had to unwind in order to legitimize the proposed transaction
before it was approved.261 Holdings’ general partner’s member interests
were solely owned by an LLC whose member interests were owned by
three voting trustees. These trustees, through control of a closely-held
corporation that owned the majority of Holdings’ outstanding units,
controlled the entire two-tier Holdings–Partners structure.262
The trustees also occupied positions on Holdings’ general partner’s
eight-person board of directors.263 Another member of the board had
served in various executive capacities at the closely-held corporation
owned by the trustees.264 Only the remaining half of the board was facially
disinterested.265 Before the proposed merger was considered, an audit
committee was created and one of the three trustees was replaced with a
disinterested board member.266 The merger would have eliminated the
second tier by cancelling Holdings’ interests in Partners.267 With the
counsel of a reputable legal team and the financial advice of Morgan
Stanley,268 and with the power to approve or reject the transaction resting
solely with the independent audit committee, the proposed merger was
approved.269
The plaintiff brought an Implied Covenant claim based on the
conflicting interests of the merging parties, alleging that the proposed
259 Id. at 1012.
260 Id.





266 Id. at 1013–14.
267 Id. at 1014.
268 Here, notice the overlap between the “complex agreement or governance scheme” and
“sophisticated parties” factors.
269 Lonergan, 5 A.3d at 1015.
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merger should not have been approved until a majority of Holdings’
minority unitholders had also approved the transaction.270 The court
rejected the plaintiff’s claim,271 and this rejection may have had some
connection to the complexity of the agreement.
To illustrate, the logic underlying the “complexity factor” is
somewhat similar to the logic underlying the “sophistication of the
parties” factor:272 (1) The Implied Covenant operates “where the contract
as a whole speaks sufficiently to suggest an obligation and point to a result,
but does not speak directly enough to provide an explicit answer.”273 (2)
The Implied Covenant applies only when it is “clear from what was
expressly agreed upon that the parties who negotiated the express terms of
the contract would have agreed to proscribe the act later complained of as
a breach . . . had they thought to negotiate with respect to that matter.”274
(3) Parties to a “simple” LLC agreement, may not engage in extremely
detailed contract drafting because they may either expect the probability
of a dispute to be low, or they may fail to anticipate the myriad of ways
that a dispute could arise. However, parties who are either drafting a
particularly complex agreement, or drafting an agreement creating a
particularly complex governance structure, are more likely to have
thought through and negotiated for the contractual provisions that, in
their respective views, would best protect their interests in light of the
intricate nature of their prospective relationship. (4) Courts should be
hesitant about implying contractual protections, especially “when the
contract easily could have been drafted to expressly provide for [these
protections].”275 (5) If certain obligations are not included in the
agreement, then it is more likely than not that the parties did not intend
for these obligations to attach at the time the agreement was signed.
In sum, a plaintiff is not likely to be successful on an Implied
Covenant claim because the Covenant covers very little territory under
Delaware’s contractarian approach, especially when the parties are
sophisticated, when the defendant does not exhibit a personal motive for
harming the plaintiff, or when the agreement at issue is complex.276 The
270 Id. at 1016.
271 Id. at 1019.
272 See supra Part IV.D.1.
273 Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984 A.2d 126, 146 (Del. Ch. 2009).
274 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
275 Airborne, 984 A.2d at 146 (quoting Allied Capital Corp. v. GC–Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020,
1035 (Del. Ch. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
276 See infra app. B.
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following section discusses why a plaintiff’s chances of success are even
slimmer when the parties have contractually eliminated fiduciary duties.277
C. The Failure of the Nested-Sphere Model in Delaware in the Context
of Fiduciary Waivers
When parties have eliminated fiduciary duties or have opted to make
an Implied Covenant claim instead of a breach of fiduciary duty claim, the
Delaware Chancery Court has indicated that especially extreme hesitancy
to find that a party has breached the Implied Covenant is warranted,
without exception for situations that would appear to deny the
complaining party the benefits of the contract.278 This hesitancy has
skewed the natural operation of the nested-sphere model by shrinking the
scope of the Implied Covenant.279 Therefore, parties should take care not
to rely solely on the Implied Covenant to fill in when fiduciary duties
have been eliminated, especially when their particular situation involves
the factors contributing to Delaware’s restrictive approach to the
Covenant.280
Lonergan clearly lends credence to this warning because it does more
than clarify the role of contractual complexity in Delaware’s narrow
reading of the Implied Covenant. This case is also critical because it
involves an Implied Covenant claim following an express fiduciary opt-
out. In the Delaware Chancery Court’s first paragraph analyzing the
plaintiff’s Implied Covenant claim, the court noted that “the complaint
contain[ed] the types of allegations commonly advanced by stockholder
plaintiffs when challenging a merger involving a corporation” and that,
presumably, “[i]n such a pleading, the plaintiff [will] assert[ ] claims for
breaches of fiduciary duty.”281
Here, the court suggested the following: If the plaintiff cannot allege
the breach of a fiduciary duty, then the plaintiff will not prevail under
another theory if the plaintiff’s claim mirrors that of other plaintiffs who
have sued successfully under fiduciary theories. With this suggestion in
mind, the plaintiff’s claim was greatly disadvantaged by the fact that
Holdings’ limited partnership agreement completely eliminated fiduciary
duties—in the court’s view, the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged bad
277 See infra app. D.
278 See infra Part V.A (discussing Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d
989 (Del. 1998) as an example of the downsides of this approach).
279 See infra app. D.
280 See supra Part IV.B (analyzing these factors in detail).
281 Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, 5 A.3d 1008, 1016 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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faith within the framework of the limited partnership agreement.282
Separating the court’s reasoning from the merits of the court’s
ultimate decision, observe the language of the court which strongly
indicates that a fiduciary opt-out should cause the scope of the Implied
Covenant to narrow even further:
When parties exercise the authority provided by the LP Act to
eliminate fiduciary duties, they take away the most powerful of a
court’s remedial and gap-filling powers. As a result, parties must
draft an LP agreement as completely as possible, and they bear the
risk of incompleteness. If the parties have agreed how to proceed
under a future state of the world, then their bargain naturally
controls. But when parties fail to address a future state of the
world—and they necessarily will because contracting is costly and
human knowledge imperfect—then the elimination of fiduciary
duties implies an agreement that losses should remain where they
fall. After all, if the parties wanted courts to be in the business of
shifting losses after the fact, then they would not have eliminated
the most powerful tool for doing so.283
This language is extremely significant because it eliminates the
possibility of loss reallocation under the Implied Covenant when fiduciary
duties are waived for two reasons. First, the court imposed an additional
burden on parties to draft a complete agreement to avoid bearing the risk
of incompleteness.284 However, the court then predicted the failure of this
endeavor, stating that parties will “necessarily” be unable to address all
future contingencies. Second, the court rejected the notion that parties
can separate fiduciary duties from the Implied Covenant and obtain
protection from the latter after eliminating the former.
Under Lonergan, once the parties significantly alter or eliminate
fiduciary duties, this action operates as a signal that the Implied Covenant
no longer holds remedial significance for the parties. This signal then
appears to play a role in how courts will interpret contracts at issue.285
282 Id. at 1016–17, 1021–22.
283 Id. at 1018.
284 See Willie Gary LLC v. James & Jackson LLC, No. Civ.A. 1781, 2006 WL 75309, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 10, 2006) (“With the contractual freedom granted by the LLC Act comes the duty to scriven with
precision.”), aff’d, 906 A.2d 76 (Del. 2006).
285 Cf. Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537,
544, 584 (1997) (arguing that fiduciary waivers affect the interpretation of partnership agreements in good-faith
analyses).
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Unfortunately, however, this signaling effect can cause courts to
improperly fuse fiduciary duty and the Implied Covenant, resulting in an
“all-or-nothing” approach where one obligation cannot be modified
without proportionally affecting the other.286
Although the Implied Covenant is a matter of statutory law in
Delaware, Lonergan essentially allows the parties to control the
effectiveness of the Covenant by the manner in which they address
fiduciary duties. Thus, the problem with the nested-sphere model reveals
itself. While, in theory, the parties should be able to remove the outer
layer of fiduciary duty without compromising the inner core of the
Implied Covenant,287 in reality, Lonergan suggests that the remedial
importance or “accessibility” of the Implied Covenant can be altered by
courts based on the parties’ alteration of fiduciary duties in the contract.288
Instead of “peeling away” fiduciary duties and leaving the Implied
Covenant untouched, Lonergan exerts inward pressure on the Covenant’s
inner sphere, thereby reducing the Covenant’s already narrow scope even
further until the conduct complained of no longer falls within the
Covenant’s territory.289
Lonergan suggests that if the parties severely reduce the scope of
fiduciary duties, then the Implied Covenant would theoretically apply
only to egregious conduct that violates the essence of the agreement.290
However, if the parties eliminate fiduciary duties altogether, then the
Implied Covenant will retain little to no residual significance in a court’s
view because the parties will have failed to retain the strongest tools
available to courts to save one party from the commercial misconduct of
another.291 In other words, the Delaware courts will not help those who
do not help themselves—if the parties choose to eliminate the courts’
286 E.g., Douzinas v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, 888 A.2d 1146, 1149–50 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“[I]n the
alternative entity context, it is frequently impossible to decide fiduciary duty claims without close examination
and interpretation of the governing instrument of the entity giving rise to what would be, under default law, a
fiduciary relationship.”). This proposition suggests that the governing instrument can have an impact on fiduciary
duty inquiries, and vice versa.
287 See infra app. C.
288 See Gold, supra note 108, at 153 (arguing that a precisely tailored fiduciary waiver allows courts to R
better determine whether the conduct at issue falls within the Implied Covenant’s boundary).
289 See infra app. D.
290 See Steele, supra note 88, at 30; cf. Sale, supra note 128, at 485 (noting that only “egregious or R
conspicuous” conduct may be subject to liability under a fiduciary conception of good faith). As mentioned
previously, however, such claims could likely be framed as fiduciary duty claims. See supra notes 136–39 and R
accompanying text.
291 Ribstein, supra note 123, at 900 (classifying the duty of good faith and fair dealing as a “lesser” duty). R
Interestingly, while the standard for fiduciary waiver is fairly strict (presumably to ensure that the parties are aware
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most effective method of regulating the parties’ relationship, then the
courts will lose sympathy for the plaintiff who attempts to use the Implied
Covenant as a means of imposing liability for conduct that could
otherwise have been addressed under a fiduciary analysis. Given Delaware
courts’ comfort with the well-established fiduciary duty framework, and
given their historical “tendency to default to . . . fiduciary duty
principles,”292 this phenomenon may be all the more acute.293
The history of Delaware’s good faith jurisprudence sheds some light
on this tendency. The Delaware Supreme Court first identified the duty
of good faith as an independent fiduciary duty in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor
Inc.294 Strangely, the court did not discuss why the good faith duty was
worthy of elevation to the status of a fiduciary duty when previous cases
merely referenced good faith as the absence of bad faith (where bad faith
was limited to tortious or borderline-tortious conduct).295 Regardless,
because Delaware has a history of classifying good faith as either a
fiduciary duty or a subset of the fiduciary duty of loyalty,296 it is not
surprising that Delaware courts would take the view that an agreement
eliminating fiduciary duties is practically equivalent to a hypothetical
agreement that eliminates good faith requirements.
So, what exactly is the purpose of the Implied Covenant when parties
eliminate fiduciary duties? If parties retain traditional fiduciary duties in an
LLC agreement, for example, then reliance on the Implied Covenant is
unnecessary—a court can simply use a fiduciary duty analysis to allocate
losses. Revisiting the nested-sphere model, because fiduciary duties
impose liability for a broader range of conduct than the Implied
Covenant, conduct violating the Implied Covenant would also violate
traditional fiduciary duties. This is a factor that makes fiduciary duties
attractive to Delaware courts—fiduciary duties are relatively easy to apply
because they cover broad territory, and because the fiduciary rubric is
of what they are waiving), once this standard is met, Delaware courts are not hesitant to eliminate the significance
of the Implied Covenant. See, e.g., Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, 40 A.3d 839, 853 (Del. Ch. 2012).
292 Steele, supra note 88, at 17. R
293 See supra notes 86–98 and accompanying text. R
294 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993); Steele, supra note 88, at 29. R
295 Steele, supra note 88, at 29. R
296 E.g., Cede, 634 A.2d at 361; In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475 n.41
(Del. Ch. 2000). Delaware courts have not taken into account the fact that one can act loyally and in bad faith
simultaneously. Sale, supra note 128, at 484. There is not necessarily an overlap between the duty of loyalty and R
the duty of good faith. For example, a disinterested fiduciary can approve a transaction that no other person
would have approved in good faith, or can act with “deliberate indifference” without the presence of a conflict of
interest. Id. In both situations, the fiduciary’s good faith is implicated although his loyalty is not. Id.
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well-cemented in Delaware jurisprudence.297 Fiduciary characterizations
assist courts not necessarily because they assume the total lack of self-
interest of the parties, but because they allow the court to assess whether
the parties “subordinate[d] their immediate self-interest to their long-
term collective interest.”298 Without such an assessment, a court can
determine that an LLC is no longer a “vehicle[ ] for the collective pursuit
of long-term, individual, self-interest” (requiring at least some
consideration for the interests of the other parties).299 Rather, the LLC
would become a vehicle for the individual pursuit of long-term,
individual, self-interest akin to an extended series of discrete, arms-length
transactions (requiring little to no consideration for the interests of the
other parties).300 Therefore, it seems that the Implied Covenant is
practically inaccessible in Delaware, whether or not the parties choose to
eliminate traditional fiduciary duties.301
This inaccessibility can trigger significant consequences because while
LLCs arise from contracts, they are also highly relational entities
characterized by complex, fluid, long-term relationships.302 Therefore,
LLC operating agreements devoid of fiduciary duties potentially pose
difficulties in situations where the Implied Covenant is no longer
sufficient to meet the changing expectations of the parties. While, in
theory, the nested-sphere model is applicable in Delaware via DLLCA,303
the way in which the Delaware courts subscribe to this model creates the
potential for results that could not be predicted by the model in its
unaltered form.304
Notably, the Lonergan court observed that, unlike discrete
transactions, relational contracts can be renegotiated if the parties are
297 See generally Manesh, supra note 6 (discussing the benefits of entity formation in Delaware). R
298 Vestal, supra note 7, at 550 (discussing fiduciary duties in the partnership context). R
299 Id. (emphasis added); see also Callison & Vestal, supra note 149, at 304 (“[P]articipants only join [a] R
firm if they expect their long-term self-interest . . . to be maximized.”).
300 See Kleinberger, supra note 154, at 22 (noting that in jurisdictions that take the contractual approach R
to the Implied Covenant, “contractual permission to compete with the LLC as a business mean[s] (implicitly)
that the members [are] at arm’s length”); see also Clancy v. King, 954 A.2d 1092, 1100 n.13 (Md. 2008) (“A
limited partnership is essentially . . . a series of contracts.”); Vestal, supra note 7, at 524 (discussing the partnership R
context, and contending that under the contractarian view, “the partnership relation is simply a shorthand for a
bundle of mutable contractual rights and obligations”).
301 See Gold, supra note 108, at 153 (“[T]here is uncertainty as to precisely when an implied good faith R
term will preclude conduct otherwise covered by fiduciary duties.”).
302 See Miller, supra note 12, at 740–41; Miller, supra note 30, at 607. R
303 DLLCA is designed to give independent effect to retained fiduciary duties and the Implied Covenant.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c) (2005).
304 Compare infra app. C, with infra app. D.
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unsatisfied with where economic losses will fall under their existing
agreement.305 This is certainly true. However, given that the majority of
long-term contracts are incomplete contracts,306 these contracts will likely
remain incomplete, even after renegotiation. Because the Implied
Covenant is a gap-filling tool, and because LLCs mainly consist of gaps
when viewed contractually,307 the Implied Covenant is critical.308 It is
doubtful that a single renegotiation will resolve the fundamental problem,
which is Delaware’s consistently hesitant approach to the Implied
Covenant, and its increased reluctance to trigger the Covenant when
fiduciary duties are waived.309 The only truly effective renegotiation
would be one involving the reinstatement of fiduciary duties to govern
the parties’ relationship.310 Anything less would merely increase both
parties’ transactions costs without proportionally increasing the protection
of either party.311
D. Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal: The LLC-Specific Implied Covenant
Case That Is the Exception, Not the Rule
There is limited Delaware case law directly addressing the fiduciary
305 Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, 5 A.3d 1008, 1018 & n.4 (Del. Ch. 2010).
306 Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161,
1187 (2010).
307 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 426–27 (“When the task is complex, when efforts will R
span a substantial time, . . . a detailed contract would be silly.”); cf. Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the
Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 216 (1992) (making this argument
in the context of closely-held corporations); Weidner, supra note 50, at 82 (“[I]ndividuals rarely ‘bargain’ as R
equals for partnership agreements that completely define their relationship. The law should assume that the
completely defined partnership relationship is the exception rather than the norm.”).
308 Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that the doctrine of
good faith is designed to minimize performance costs and advance the mutual goals of the parties).
309 Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1998)
(warning that the application of the Implied Covenant should be a “cautious enterprise”).
310 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 427 (“The duty of loyalty replaces detailed contractual R
terms.”); see also Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413, 447 (1986)
(arguing that “[f]iduciary duties are a substitute for costly contracts.”); Miller, supra note 30, at 606 (arguing that R
prohibiting the elimination of fiduciary duties would be best to protect contractual freedom while guarding
against opportunistic conduct). Especially in light of Delaware’s restrictive approach to the Implied Covenant, a
contract retaining fiduciary duties would be a more efficient choice than a contract that would be subject to a
constant and costly cycle of dispute and renegotiation. See Eggleston et al., supra note 246, at 120 (contending that R
simple contracts are beneficial in reducing enforcement costs and the risk of improper judicial interpretation).
311 See Means, supra note 306, at 1189 (noting that transactions costs limit parties’ ability to rectify R
contractual gaps).
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duty–Implied Covenant relationship in the LLC context.312 Fisk Ventures,
LLC v. Segal313 is Delaware’s current template for addressing the Implied
Covenant in light of a fiduciary opt-out in the LLC context. In that case,
Fisk Ventures LLC was a member of Genetrix LLC, a company with an
extended history of fundraising difficulties.314 The Genetrix LLC
agreement eliminated fiduciary duties and required the approval of 75% of
the Genetrix board of directors to implement certain financing
proposals.315 Segal, the president of Genetrix, presented certain financing
proposals to the Genetrix board, but failed to obtain the requisite 75%
vote of approval.316
When Fisk Ventures attempted to dissolve Genetrix, Segal responded
by alleging, among other things, that Fisk breached its fiduciary duty as
well as the Implied Covenant by undermining Segal’s proposal for
Genetrix.317 The Delaware Chancery Court swiftly rejected Segal’s claims
in light of the LLC agreement, under which Genetrix’s board members
could freely vote in favor or against Segal’s (or any individual’s) financing
proposals.318 According to the court, the mere exercise of contractual
rights could never constitute a bad faith violation of the Implied
Covenant.319 Rather, the court maintained that Segal failed to state a
claim by making the conclusory allegation that the board had acted in bad
faith by failing to approve Segal’s plan.320 The Delaware Supreme Court
later affirmed the chancery court’s ruling.321
If there was any lingering confusion regarding the limited scope of the
Implied Covenant under Delaware law, the chancery court eliminated it:
312 Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Entities—2005 Developments in Limited Liability Companies
and Limited Liability Partnerships, ALI–ABA VIDEO L. REV. (March, 17, 2005) (“[I]t cannot be stated with
confidence how the Delaware courts will interpret the limitation imposed by [DLLCA] section 18-1101(e) that
waivers of fiduciary duties may not extend to bad faith violations of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”);
Manesh, supra note 6, at 244 (noting that the tension between fiduciary duties and the Implied Covenant have R
planted the “latent seeds of indeterminacy” in Delaware LLC law); Scott Gordon Wheeler, Comment, LLC
Fiduciaries: Where Has All the Good Faith Gone?, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 1063, 1074 (2011).
313 Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017–CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008),
aff’d, 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009).
314 Id.
315 Id. at *2, *11.
316 Id. at *5–6
317 Id. at *6.
318 Id. at *2, *10–11.
319 Id. at *11.
320 Id.
321 Segal v. Fisk Ventures, LLC, 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009).
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Although occasionally described in broad terms, the implied
covenant is not a panacea for the disgruntled litigant. In fact it is
clear that that a court cannot and should not use the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to fill a gap in a contract
with an implied term unless it is clear from the contract that the
parties would have agreed to that term had they thought to
negotiate the matter. Only rarely invoked successfully, the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing protects the spirit of what
was actually bargained and negotiated for in the contract.
Moreover, because the implied covenant is, by definition, implied,
and because it protects the spirit of the agreement rather than the
form, it cannot be involved where the contract itself expressly
covers the subject at issue.322
The court’s language begs the question of whether the Implied
Covenant has been reduced to a mere formality. It would certainly appear
so, given the court’s language.
However, it is clearly poor strategy for a litigant to claim that conduct
breached either fiduciary duties or the Implied Covenant when that
conduct was well within the scope of conduct allowable under the LLC
agreement, especially when the agreement eliminated fiduciary duties.323
In the context of the nested-sphere model, there is nothing exceptional
about the Fisk decision. Rather, the outcome in Fisk was unremarkable
given the weakness of Segal’s counterclaim—Segal was improperly
attempting to use a bad faith allegation to avoid the LLC agreement and
to obtain unilateral control over the direction of Genetrix’s financing.324
Therefore, Fisk is entirely outside the bounds of the nested-sphere
model, and is an exception to this Article’s observations regarding the two
effects of Delaware Covenant law on the nested-sphere model—the
322 Fisk, 2008 WL 1961156, at *10 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
323 See id. at *11; Terry A. Lambert Plumbing Inc. v. W. Sec. Bank, 934 F.2d 976, 983 (8th Cir. 1991)
(“Acting according to express terms of a contract is not a breach of good faith and fair dealing.”); Price v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that good faith and fair dealing “does not
impose any affirmative duty of moderation in the enforcement of legal rights”). There are two arguments
regarding whether the LLC agreement eliminated fiduciary duties, or just modified them. On one hand, the
agreement purported to eliminate fiduciary duties by stating that members would not have any duties that had not
been “expressly articulated,” and fiduciary duties were not expressly articulated in the agreement. See Fisk, 2008
WL 1961156, at *11. On the other hand, the agreement still held members responsible for fraud, gross
negligence, and intentional wrongdoing, lending credence to the argument that the agreement merely modified
fiduciary duties. See id. at *9. The former argument seems more persuasive than the latter.
324 See Fisk, 2008 WL 1961156, at *11.
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Covenant’s initially narrow scope and its reduced scope after a fiduciary
waiver. First, Fisk is outside the bounds of this Article’s previous
discussion of the factors influencing Delaware’s narrow view of the
Implied Covenant. Although the parties in Fisk could accurately be
portrayed as sophisticated, this factor did not appear to have any effect on
the court’s decision. In fact, the claim was bound to fail regardless of the
Implied Covenant’s initial scope. Revisiting the nested-sphere model and
disregarding the parties’ fiduciary waiver, the mere exercise of explicitly-
granted contractual rights fails to give rise to an action for breach of the
Implied Covenant.325
Second, Fisk appears to be the exception to the “Lonergan rule”
because the Fisk decision did not condition loss allocation under the
Covenant on the parties’ treatment of fiduciary duties. In other words, the
conduct at issue fell within a range of permissible conduct, necessarily
precluding a breach of fiduciary duty claim.326 No alteration of the model
was necessary to achieve this result, even though the parties eliminated
fiduciary duties. In contrast, the Lonergan court did not say that the
plaintiff’s claim would have failed under a fiduciary duty analysis.
Therefore, while the Lonergan court’s interpretation of the effect of a
fiduciary waiver on the Implied Covenant can be categorized as a major
alteration of the nested-sphere model, the Fisk court’s interpretation of
the same waiver cannot be similarly categorized.
However, parties relying solely on the Implied Covenant should not
overfocus on the specific facts of Fisk—taken together, the rule in
Lonergan combined with the chancery court’s language in Fisk are
indicative of Delaware’s likely future approach to the Implied Covenant in
the LLC context.
V. DELAWARE IS SET TO TAKE THE WRONG APPROACH TO THE
IMPLIED COVENANT IN THE LLC CONTEXT
Undoubtedly, it should be more difficult to prevail under the Implied
Covenant than fiduciary duties. Otherwise, every contractual relationship
would be a fiduciary relationship, and vice versa. However, the Covenant
must be given some meaning independent of fiduciary duties. Otherwise,
the elimination of fiduciary duties risks leaving parties completely
unprotected from the opportunistic behavior of their fellow parties.327
325 See infra app. A.
326 See Fisk, 2008 WL 1961156, at *11.
327 In this respect, an approach to the contractual Covenant that considers a certain degree of fairness is
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An agreement that relies solely on the Implied Covenant provides
little by way of analogy to partnership and corporate law—two arenas in
which Delaware courts have enjoyed considerable comfort. This is
precisely where the problem arises with Delaware’s approach arises. As
mentioned previously, Delaware’s corporate law paradigm has historically
conflated the duty of good faith and the fiduciary duty of loyalty.328
However, at least in the corporate context, the duty of loyalty cannot be
eliminated,329 meaning that, even in a jurisprudential regime that conflates
the two obligations, the duty of good faith can never be eliminated.
Therefore, there is no practical need to distinguish between fiduciary
duties and the duty of good faith under Delaware corporate law. In
contrast, Delaware’s alternative-entity paradigm allows fiduciary duties to
be completely eliminated, while by statute, the Implied Covenant cannot
be eliminated.330 Therefore, there is a need to distinguish the Covenant
from fiduciary duties in this context.
As the following sections discuss, while Delaware courts addressing
Covenant claims purport to consider the contemplations of the parties
during the negotiation and drafting processes, their failure to consider the
Covenant independently of fiduciary duties leads these courts to neglect
parties’ reasonable, post-agreement expectations in deciding whether to
trigger the Covenant. This approach is especially problematic after the
parties have opted out of fiduciary duties. Further, this approach does not
properly accommodate average LLCs, which are typically formed without
extensive negotiation.
A. The Consequences of Favoring Party Contemplations over Party
Expectations in an Implied Covenant Inquiry
Delaware requires the parties to contemplate—but fail to express—a
resolution to the matter in dispute before the Implied Covenant can
apply.331 To the extent that it is impossible for parties to “negotiate and
preferable. See, e.g., Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 444 (Del. 2005) (“[A]lthough the
obligation of good faith does not require the insurer to relieve the insured of all possible harm that may come
from his choice of policy limits, it does obligate the insurer not to take advantage of the unequal positions in order
to become a secondary source of injury to the insured.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
328 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); supra text accompanying notes
294–96. R
329 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005).
330 See tit. 6, § 18-1101(c).
331 E.g., Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984 A.2d 126, 146 (Del. Ch. 2009); Danby v.
Osteopathic Hosp. Ass’n of Del., 101 A.2d 308, 313–14 (Del. Ch. 1953), aff’d, 104 A.2d 903 (Del. 1954).
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describe within their contract all of the possible provisions that could be
included,”332 this requirement is justifiable. However, while all long-term
contracts are incomplete to some extent,333 Delaware court treatment of
the Implied Covenant creates a perverse incentive to draft contracts that
are “uncomfortably” incomplete: To successfully make an Implied
Covenant claim, the parties must have entered an agreement that is silent
on a matter that they clearly contemplated and could have expressed,334
but they must not have entered an agreement that will be deemed
“intentionally silent,” in which case the Covenant will not apply at all.335
However, if the parties clearly contemplated a matter, it would seem
that the matter contemplated would be the most likely to be actually
included in the contract, and that Implied Covenant protection would
therefore be unnecessary. So why are Delaware courts seemingly willing
to reward parties with the protection of the Implied Covenant for drafting
“half-baked” contracts that fail to mention basic matters that are within
the parties’ contemplation? Arguably, the matters that should be the
subject of the Implied Covenant are those that are just outside of the
parties’ contemplations, but are within the realm of the parties’ reasonable
expectations.
Instead, in applying Implied Covenant analyses, Delaware courts have
neglected the reasonable expectations of the parties in favor of the parties’
unexpressed contemplations.336 The Delaware Chancery Court illustrated
this phenomenon in Danby v. Osteopathic Hospital Ass’n of Delaware,337 a
case that was later affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court:
The law will imply an agreement by the parties to contract
and to do and perform those things which according to reason
Compare this approach with that of the Seventh Circuit in Kham, where the court labeled good faith as “an
implied undertaking not to take opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contemplated at the time of
drafting, and which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the parties.” Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First
Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). See also discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
332 Paul M. Altman & Srinivas M. Raju, Delaware Alternative Entities and the Implied Contractual Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under Delaware Law, 60 BUS. LAW. 1469, 1476 (2005) (citing Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del Ch. Dec. 30, 1991)).
333 Cf. O’Kelley, Jr., supra note 306 (closely-held corporation context); Weidner, supra note 50, at 82 R
(partnership context).
334 See In re Broadstripe, LLC, 435 B.R. 245, 263 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).
335 See Dave Greytak Enters. v. Mazda Motors, 622 A.2d 14, 23 (Del. Ch. 1992).
336 See generally Means, supra note 305 (arguing that contractarian theory does not protect party
expectations as well as the application of equitable contract principles).
337 Danby v. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass’n of Del., 101 A.2d 308 (Del. Ch. 1953), aff’d, 104 A.2d 903 (Del.
1954).
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and justice they should do in order to carry out the purpose for
which the contract is made. However, such promise can be
implied only where it can be rightfully assumed that it would have
been made if attention had been directed to it. A promise will not
be read into a contract unless it arises by necessary implication
from the provisions thereof. Terms are to be implied in a contract
not because they are reasonable but because they are necessarily
involved in the contractual relationship so that the parties must have
intended them and have only failed to express them because they are too
obvious to need expression.338
This language suggests that when parties contemplate terms, they can
get the protection of the Implied Covenant when they stop short of
including explicit evidence of their contemplation in their agreement, so
long as the matter contemplated is sufficiently obvious.339 However, by
stating that “[t]erms are [not] to be implied in a contract . . . because
they are reasonable,” the court suggested that the Implied Covenant will
not protect expectations that were not contemplated, that were non-
obvious, or that arose after the agreement was complete, even if it would
be reasonable to do so.340 This reasoning is necessarily incomplete because
it fails to consider certain unique instances in which the Implied Covenant
should be triggered—such as when parties form expectations without
contemplating the precise instances in which those expectations will be
undermined.
Cincinnati SMSA v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Systems Co.341 illustrates the
consequences of this approach. In Cincinnati, the parties formed a limited
partnership for the purpose of providing one type of cellular service.342
338 Id. at 313–14 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
339 There is a separate argument here that if an issue or term is sufficiently obvious, there is no need to
contemplate it in the first place.
340 Lonergan cited Dunlap (an insurance torts case discussed supra Part III.B.1) for the proposition that
“[i]mplying contract terms is an occasional necessity . . . to ensure [that] parties’ reasonable expectations are
fulfilled.” Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, 5 A.3d 1008, 1018 (Del. Ch. 2010) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 442 (Del. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As
discussed supra Part III.B, using language from tort cases while taking a contractual stance in an Implied Covenant
inquiry is problematic. Because a contractual approach does not consider fairness, it can be concluded that
Delaware courts would view the consideration of the parties’ reasonable expectations—a standard imported from
the tort context—as unnecessary and irrelevant in a contract case. In other words, Lonergan’s citation to Dunlap
implies that the “occasional necessity” to trigger the Covenant to protect reasonable expectations only arises in
the tort context.
341 Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989 (Del. 1998).
342 Id. at 991.
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The limited partnership agreement contained a noncompete clause
prohibiting the parties from providing any competing services within the
FCC’s existing two-license framework.343 The plaintiff sued for breach of
the Implied Covenant based on the defendant’s provision of a new type of
cellular service that was not included in the noncompete clause (because
the new type of service did not exist at the time of the limited partnership
agreement), but which resulted in competition with the plaintiff.344
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s ruling
that the competing partner did not breach the Implied Covenant on the
grounds that the competitive conduct was not covered under the limited
partnership agreement.345 However, when the limited partnership
agreement at issue was drafted, the complaining party could not have
anticipated that a new type of cellular service—one falling outside of the
FCC’s licensing framework available at the time of the agreement—would
serve as a means for the other party to compete with the partnership in
spite of the agreement’s noncompete clause.346 Therefore, the new form
of cellular service could not truly be classified as “too obvious to need
expression.” This is the “contemplation” prong of the analysis that caused
the Cincinnati court to decline to trigger the Implied Covenant to prevent
the competing partner from continuing to offer the competitive cellular
service.
But what about the role of reasonable expectations? In Implied
Covenant cases, courts “must extrapolate the spirit of the agreement
343 Id.
344 Id. In Cincinnati, it was not apparent whether or not the parties had retained, modified, or eliminated
fiduciary duties in their agreement. On one hand, it could be argued that the noncompete clause merely
reinforced the duty of loyalty. On the other hand, it could be argued that the inclusion of the clause indicated that
the duty of loyalty had been modified to cover only the matters included in the clause. However, this point is not
critical to the analysis in this section because not only must fiduciary waivers be express, see supra note 119 and R
accompanying text, but also the plaintiff did not bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the defendant for
competing with the limited partnership. As shown in Appendix B, a fiduciary duty of loyalty claim could have
substituted for the Implied Covenant claim in Cincinnati. See infra app. B. However, if a party chooses not to bring
a fiduciary duty claim when such a claim is available to them, then this is the functional equivalent of a situation in
which the parties eliminated fiduciary duties. See infra app. D. Therefore, in light of Lonergan, the outcome in
Cincinnati presumably would have been the same, with or without a fiduciary waiver, due to Lonergan’s conflation
of fiduciary duties with the Covenant.
345 Cincinnati, 708 A.2d at 994.
346 See id. at 991. Here, an approach to the Covenant that incorporates fairness considerations is
preferable, because it uses the Covenant as a tool to imply contractual terms in light of “unanticipated
developments.” See Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 441 (Del. 2005) (“The covenant is ‘best
understood as a way of implying terms in the agreement,’ whether employed to analyze unanticipated
developments or to fill gaps in the contract’s provisions.”).
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through the express terms and determine the terms that the parties would
have bargained for to govern the dispute had they foreseen the
circumstances under which their dispute arose.”347 However, the
Cincinnati court failed to independently include the expectations of the
complaining party in its analysis. Prevention of competition was the
fundamental purpose of the Cincinnati noncompete clause. By restricting
all existing methods of providing competing services at the formation of
the partnership, the complaining party clearly had a reasonable
expectation that the other party would not compete with the partnership.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that had the new form of
competition existed during negotiations, the parties would have included
it in the noncompete clause. It cannot be logically contended that the
complaining party—by signing an agreement that prohibited cellular
service under the two-license framework in existence at the time of the
agreement—was granting permission to the other party to compete with
the partnership in the future by using a new form of competition that had
not been conceived when the agreement was signed. However, this is
essentially the proposition that was suggested by the court’s decision.
It is often noted that the Implied Covenant cannot be used to override
one or more express contractual provisions.348 Does this restriction justify
the outcome in a case like Cincinnati? The answer depends on what it
means to “override” a contractual provision. A contractualist would say
that any attempt to impose liability under the Implied Covenant for
conduct falling outside the bounds of the noncompete clause would
constitute an improper override. This is the strict contractual approach
that was taken by the Cincinnati court. On the other hand, there is an
argument that implying a general covenant not to compete would not
have overridden the noncompete clause, but rather would have been
complementary to the contractual provision that was already in place. This
is an argument supporting a broader reading of the Implied Covenant’s
role.349 In this respect, Cincinnati is unique because, although the parties
addressed the issue of competition in their agreement, the timing of their
347 Kelly v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 99C-09-265 WCC, 2002 WL 88939, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct.
Jan. 17, 2002) (emphasis added).
348 See Gilbert v. El Paso, 575 A.2d 1131, 1143 (Del. 1990).
349 See Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 444 (2005) (“[T]he implied covenant of
good faith is the obligation to preserve the spirit of the bargain rather than the letter, the adherence to substance
rather than form. . . . It requires more than just literal compliance with [contracts] and statutes. The implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that [one party] act in a way that honors the [the other party’s]
reasonable expectations.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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agreement prevented them from foreseeing and addressing the type of
competition that would give rise to their future dispute.
Not all courts are quite as strict as Delaware courts are when applying
(or failing to apply) the Implied Covenant in the contractual setting. For
example, a Texas court observed that a party breaches the Implied
Covenant by performing a contract “in a manner that is unfaithful to the
purpose of the contract and justified expectations of the other party are thus
denied.”350 This approach not only examines the four corners of the
contract, but also gives weight to the complaining party’s reasonable
expectations of what protections the contract would likely provide should
a dispute arise.351 This broader reading arguably accommodates the
relational nature of the LLC better than Delaware’s purely contractual
approach.352
In contrast, an extremely narrow interpretation of the Implied
Covenant, leads to Cincinnati-type outcomes, and allows parties to
circumvent the purpose of a contract by conducting themselves in a
manner that falls just outside of the four corners of the agreement. In
contrast, a broader interpretation better protects the purpose of the
Implied Covenant by ensuring that the reasonable expectations of the
complaining party are met.353 Essentially, the difference between these
two approaches to the Implied Covenant is marked by what the court
chooses to emphasize—the purpose and substance of the parties’
interactions giving rise to the parties’ expectations, or the form of the
contract evidencing the parties’ contemplations.
Would party expectations be better protected by the Implied
Covenant in situations allowing one or more parties to exercise discretion
under a contractual term? The issue in this context is whether and when a
court will limit the exercise of discretion when a contract itself does
not.354 There are two ways of interpreting a discretion-granting clause:
either it is complete and “gapless” (and therefore, precludes application of
the Implied Covenant if the defendant’s conduct was not unreasonable),
or it leaves one or more gaps by failing to set concrete parameters for the
350 Kira, Inc. v. All Star Maint., No. A-03-CA-950 LY, 2006 WL 2193006, at *14 (W.D. Tex. July 31,
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
351 This approach is similar to the approach taken by the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
352 See discussion infra Part VI.
353 See Altman & Raju, supra note 332, at 1469, 1474 (“The Implied Covenant . . . serves as a method of R
protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties, and is best understood in that sense.”).
354 Id. at 1480–81.
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discretion-exercising party (in which case the Implied Covenant would
theoretically apply to a wider range of conduct).355 Delaware cases have
occasionally utilized the Implied Covenant to deny defendants’ motions to
dismiss with respect to discretionary decisions including stock valuation at
“fair value,”356 and modification of preferred stockholders’ conversion
rights.357
Overall, however, a plaintiff’s luck in a discretion-type case is not
much better than in any other context.358 In Nemec v. Shrader, the
Delaware Supreme Court failed to utilize the Implied Covenant in the
corporate context to impose liability on a defendant who redeemed the
plaintiffs’ stock the day before the defendant planned to sell a portion of
its business to a private equity firm for four times the stock’s book
value.359 Although the defendants had a contractual right to redeem the
plaintiffs’ stock at the defendant’s discretion, the supreme court did not
take the timing of the redemption into consideration in evaluating
whether the defendant’s discretion was exercised in good faith and
whether the plaintiff was stripped of his reasonable expectations. Notably,
the Nemec court highlighted that because the plaintiff’s claim arose from
the defendant’s exercise of contractually-granted discretion, fiduciary duty
claims had been fully foreclosed.360
The Nemec holding mirrors holdings in the alternative-entity
context.361 For example, in the limited partnership context, the court in
Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund II, L.P. noted
that the defendant–general partner’s contractual right to exercise
discretion in deciding whether to include the plaintiff–limited partner in
the partnership’s new investments was subject to a standard of
reasonableness, but failed to impose liability based on the duty of good
355 See Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1223, 1287 (1999).
356 Gale v. Bershad, No. CIV. A. 15714, 1998 WL 118022, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 1998).
357 Winston v. Mandor, 710 A.2d 835, 843–44 (Del. Ch. 1997).
358 E.g., Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984 A.2d 126, 146 (Del. Ch. 2009).
359 Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1124–25 (Del. 2010).
360 Id. at 1129. Note that Nemec closely parallels cases in which fiduciary duties and the Implied
Covenant would apply to the dispute, but in which the parties have chosen to eliminate fiduciary duties. See supra
Part IV.D (discussing Fisk, a case in which the plaintiff brought an Implied Covenant claim when the parties had
agreed to eliminate fiduciary duties).
361 SANDRA K. MILLER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: A COMMON MODEL OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
§ 5.22 (2011).
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faith.362 Rather, the court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings.363 The Supreme Court reversed (instructing that the
parties be given a chance to conduct discovery), but maintained that while
a standard of reasonableness applied to the defendant’s conduct, the
plaintiff would need to prove that the defendant had a tortious state of
mind if the parties reached trial.364 Notably, neither the chancery court
nor the supreme court addressed the fact that the defendant could have
acted unreasonably without acting tortiously, and that the defendant
could have thereby defeated the plaintiff’s case while simultaneously
violating the applicable standard of conduct.
B. Delaware’s Conception of the Implied Covenant Does Not Adequately
Protect Parties in the “Average” LLC
Proponents of a strict contractarian view may have a viable argument
that without accompanying fiduciary duties, “good faith as a lens through
which judges scrutinize past acts does no more than encourage subjective
conclusions in hindsight based upon events never anticipated much less
assumed by the parties who initiated the conduct the court must
scrutinize.”365 However, this is not a necessary conclusion. At best, this
view limits the role of the Implied Covenant to those cases “where abject
and inexcusable inaction in the face of a known duty to act has been
established.”366 At worst, this view demotes the Implied Covenant to the
status of a mere “labeling tool” or “rhetorical device.”367
According to the contractarian perspective, if a jurisdiction adopts a
broader conception of the Implied Covenant, courts run the risk of
blocking parties’ abilities to truly define the entire scope of their
interactions through their contractual expressions.368 For example, a
contractualist might support the decision of the Cincinnati court by
arguing that it was possible that the parties intended to limit the range of
prohibited competition to exactly what was provided for in the limited
362 Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund II, L.P., No. 12449, 1992 WL
181718, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 28, 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 624 A.2d 1199 (Del. 1993).
363 See Desert Equities, 624 A.2d at 1208.
364 Id.
365 Steele, supra note 88, at 30. R
366 Id.
367 Id.
368 Van Alstine, supra note 355, at 1292 (“There is persuasive force in the argument that informed parties R
should be able to agree at the formation stage on a contractual power whose exercise is not subject to subsequent
review under external standards of ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ conduct.”).
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partnership agreement’s noncompete clause.369 In addition to eliminating
fiduciary duties, parties may actually want to reduce the risk that one party
or another will later sue successfully under an Implied Covenant theory.
This is likely the reasoning behind Delaware’s overwhelming aversion to
imposing liability under the Implied Covenant when fiduciary duties are
eliminated—“[t]he capacity to achieve contractual certainty and
contractual control over the business relationship is . . . an important
policy goal when the parties have chosen to form an LLC and to enter
into an LLC operating agreement.”370
However, this policy choice cuts both ways: Why should a court be
permitted to determine that the parties did not want to both eliminate
fiduciary duties and retain the full protection of the Implied Covenant?371
This is a question that the Delaware courts have yet to answer. Thus,
Delaware’s approach, while arguably defensible in theory, is not ideal in
practice. The fact that LLCs are contractual creatures creates a significant
downside for parties that eliminate fiduciary duties under a narrow
reading of the Implied Covenant because this approach fails to properly
take the relational nature of LLCs into consideration by improperly
equating an LLC agreement with a transaction in which the parties are
disinterested in the future evolution of their relationship.372 However, as
the frequency and significance of the interactions between parties increase,
so do the parties’ reasonable expectations and reliance interests.373
Therefore, when a court intervenes but disregards the unique nature of an
LLC by adhering solely to the parties’ contract and reading the Implied
Covenant too narrowly, that court neglects the Implied Covenant’s
369 See Means, supra note 306, at 1185 (stating that a “decision to waive certain protections is not an R
oversight; it is a specific choice”).
370 Miller, supra note 12, at 741. R
371 See Eggleston et al., supra note 246, at 120 (noting that simple contracts are beneficial in reducing R
enforcement costs and the risk of improper judicial interpretation); George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague
Contract Terms: A Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1065 (2002) (noting the
benefits of contractual vagueness in preventing evidence overinvestment). But see Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner,
LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL 1124451, at *7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) (assuming the
propriety of Delaware’s sparing application of the Implied Covenant to prevent the parties from being
involuntarily burdened by judicial error).
372 See supra text accompanying notes 302–04. R
373 Miller, supra note 12, at 741; cf. Phillips, supra note 101, at 1205–06 (“The duty of good faith and fair R
dealing has been invoked by courts in creditor–debtor disputes on grounds that the continuing and established course
of relations between the parties may give rise to expectations of the parties beyond that in their express agreement.”
(emphasis added)); Means, supra note 306 (discussing this point in the context of the unlimited life span of R
corporations).
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potential for flexible application.374
It can be assumed that the parties, by entering into an LLC
agreement, are seeking mutual benefit by allocating risk and minimizing
performance costs.375 However, in situations marked by unequal
bargaining power, more powerful parties may be able to alter this balance
of mutuality and promote a greater level of allowable self-interest by
eliminating fiduciary duties to the detriment of the weaker party.376
Referring to the partnership setting, one commentator argued that
“[w]hen coupled with a duty of good faith, eliminating mandatory
fiduciary duties will allow efficient agreements with maximum
certainty.”377 Notably, however, this statement was tempered by the
commentator’s presumption that the parties would have equal bargaining
power, identical powers and rights once the entity was formed, and
sufficient reputational constraints to support greater freedom of
contract.378 Without these factors, certainty is compromised. Further, the
presumption of equal bargaining power is unrealistic given that the typical
“bargaining process involves human foible and important information
asymmetries, if not outright fraud.”379
Regardless of the relative bargaining power of the parties, the pattern
of Delaware’s Implied Covenant jurisprudence warns parties that an
agreement that eliminates fiduciary duties constitutes a “bad” bargain
because it will necessarily fail to protect against the broadest possible range
of objectionable conduct.380 And if a dispute arises under a bad bargain in
Delaware, then the court has a legitimate reason to refuse to enforce the
Implied Covenant in favor of the complaining party—it is well recognized
that the Implied Covenant is not designed to rescue parties from unfair,
unwise, or unreasonable agreements, or to “rebalance[ ] economic
374 See Means, supra note 306, at 1190–91 (advocating for the use of “equitable contract principles” and R
noting that courts can use contract law to reduce transactions costs by preventing opportunistic behavior).
375 Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991); see Hanno, supra note 128, at R
105 (noting that, under the traditional view, LLC parties are not just contractual cooperators, but their
relationship is “inherently fiduciary” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
376 Miller, supra note 12, at 732 (warning that “judicial monitoring and statutory constraints [are R
needed] to address the hazards of power imbalances” during LLC formation). But cf. Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d
11, 20 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that privately ordered corporate exculpatory provisions do not create a “license to
steal” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
377 J. Dennis Hynes, An Inquiry Into Freedom of Contract, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 53 (1995).
378 Id.
379 Weidner, supra note 50, at 82. R
380 See infra app. D.
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interests” after-the-fact.381 Therefore, under this line of reasoning,
advocates of the contractarian approach to the Implied Covenant would
construe these “strict” court decisions as the mere enforcement of bad
contracts.382
Although parties can protect themselves from similar findings by
raising their customized standard of good faith above the “floor,” in a
context in which the parties have chosen to eliminate fiduciary duties, it is
unlikely that they would make their standard of good faith more rigorous
in the same agreement.383 This situation creates a substantial degree of
risk, especially for unsophisticated parties.384 Empirical evidence shows
that the vast majority of LLCs are created with uncomplicated agreements
or basic forms, and that a substantial percentage of LLCs are formed
without a written agreement at all.385 Further, many drafters are unaware
of changes in Delaware fiduciary duty law,386 and small LLCs may initially
rely on trust as a substitute for incurring the exponential transaction costs
associated with drafting detailed agreements.387 Consequently, many
drafters may not realize that by eliminating fiduciary duties, they are
actually damaging their chances of prevailing under the Implied
Covenant—moreover, they may not know that they never had a high
probability of prevailing under the Implied Covenant in the first place.
Delaware courts’ treatment of parties who eliminate fiduciary duties is
better suited to large, sophisticated LLCs that have adequate legal
representation388 and the desire to reduce negotiation costs by “effectively
mak[ing] a public good of the private complexity, . . . alienation, and
suspicion” of traditional fiduciary duties.389 However, “[t]he
contractarian approach misses the mark . . . if the goal is to meet the
reasonable expectations of typical [entities] and society.”390 Small
381 See Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1128 (Del. 2010).
382 See Means, supra note 336, at 1185 (“[C]ourts routinely enforce unwise contractual bargains . . . .”). R
383 See Hynes, supra note 377, at 48. R
384 See Miller, supra note 12, at 739 (“[T]he contractarian approach to fiduciary duties presupposes R
perfect market conditions—that is, the existence of [parties] who are equally poised to bargain for optimal
fiduciary duty protections.”).
385 Hanno, supra note 128, at 113–14. R
386 See id. at 114; see also Miller, supra note 12, at 739 (discussing studies showing that many lawyers are R
not fully informed with respect to relevant LLC law); Miller, supra note 12, 734, 737–38 & nn.41–59 (suggesting R
that the representation of legal counsel in the LLC context is less than optimal in a substantial number of LLC
arrangements and that most LLC agreements are insufficiently tailored).
387 Means, supra note 305, at 1164.
388 Hanno, supra note 128, at 114. R
389 Vestal, supra note 7, at 572–73. R
390 Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIB\21-1\MIB102.txt unknown Seq: 63 26-MAR-13 9:48
2013] LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 173
businesses or unsophisticated parties may mistakenly rely on the Implied
Covenant as a suitable “catch-all” protection. Moreover, given that there
are varying levels of sophistication among LLC members, unequal
bargaining power can leave less-sophisticated members with unprotected
and ultimately unrealized expectations.391 For this reason, one
commentator noted that Delaware’s “[u]nbridled ‘freedom of contract’
[policy] is little more than the law of the jungle.”392
VI. ADMITTING THAT THE CURRENT ROLE OF THE IMPLIED
COVENANT IS NO ROLE AT ALL
Delaware’s statutory scheme is designed to impart independent
significance to fiduciary duties and the Implied Covenant.393 The nested-
sphere model is representative of this design.394 However, because the
reasoning of the Delaware courts has improperly skewed the model, the
“implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” has become a
deceivingly grandiose phrase that suggests so much in theory but
accomplishes so little in practice.395 An extremely high evidentiary
standard combined with an extremely limited willingness to invoke the
Covenant has resulted in complete failure of alternative-entity Covenant
claims in Delaware.396 Ultimately, therefore, the Implied Covenant is not
sufficient to replace or emulate the protections that fiduciary duties
provide.397
Part V argued that Delaware’s current approach to the Implied
Covenant is less than ideal. However, assuming that Delaware continues
with this approach, one is left to question why the Delaware courts cling
to the Implied Covenant’s “unbecomingly ostentatious moniker.”398 One
391 See Hanno, supra note 128, at 114. R
392 Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 975, 1019 (2006).
393 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c) (2005); see Steele, supra note 88, at 14. R
394 See infra app. A.
395 See Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991) (arguing that the Implied
Covenant does not actively serve to inject morality in the contracting process); Wheeler, supra note 312, at 1076 R
(arguing that the Implied Covenant does little to protect parties in Delaware).
396 Wheeler, supra note 312, at 1076. R
397 See Miller, supra note 30, at 606–11 (providing reasons why the Implied Covenant does not R
sufficiently check opportunistic behavior in LLCs); Hanno, supra note 128 (arguing that the Implied Covenant is R
an “inadequate substitute” for fiduciary duties). But see Manesh, supra note 6, at 244 (“[The] universality, R
unwaivability, and contextual evolution [of the Implied Covenant]—suggest that [it] is well-suited to serve as a
doctrinal substitute for the fiduciary duties of corporate law, to deal with the ongoing relational context of LLCs,
and to ensure equitable results.” (footnotes omitted)).
398 Wheeler, supra note 312, at 1076. R
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reason could be that the Delaware courts dislike change. After all, it took a
statutory amendment to nudge the courts away from the fiduciary-based
analyses that had become second nature in the corporate and partnership
contexts.399
However, because the Delaware alternative-entity statutes are
designed to promote maximum contractual freedom, on some level, the
Implied Covenant does not fit with the Delaware legislature’s extreme
bent in favor of contractual freedom. Certainly, the outcomes of Delaware
Covenant cases have resolved this lack of synchronicity in favor of the
portion of the statutory provisions emphasizing contractual freedom.
However, while the courts’ resolutions thus far have suggested a complete
lack of regard for the relevancy of the Implied Covenant, the courts’
language deceivingly suggests that the Implied Covenant may apply in
future, sufficiently “worthy” cases containing the perfect mixture of
factors and circumstances that the courts have deemed critical to the
success of Covenant claims. In the meantime, while Delaware courts
continue to wait for the “ideal” Implied Covenant case, ambiguity and
uncertainty will continue to taint the contract-negotiation process as
many parties may be lulled into eliminating fiduciary duties, believing that
the Implied Covenant will provide adequate protection should disputes
arise.400
Because the Implied Covenant is unwaivable as a matter of statutory
law, Delaware courts cannot explicitly render the Implied Covenant
toothless, lest they find themselves repeating the mistakes that were made
in Gotham. However, the Delaware statutes do not enumerate exactly
what protections the Covenant provides, thereby opening a loophole for
the courts.401 Therefore, the courts have retained the Implied Covenant
paradigm, but have made it clear that the Covenant has no role in an
analysis that strictly interprets the elimination of fiduciary duties as a signal
that the parties intended to be unhindered by the limitations of external
behavioral norms (including the norms that would be imposed by the
courts themselves). Although the courts’ current approach to the
Covenant facially honors the prohibition on the contractual elimination of
399 See supra text accompanying notes 89–99 (discussing Gotham, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., R
817 A.2d 160 (Del. 2002) and the 2004 DLLCA amendment).
400 See Frey, 941 F.2d at 593 (“The particular confusion to which the vaguely moralistic overtones of
‘good faith’ give rise is the belief that every contract establishes a fiduciary relationship.”); Phillips, supra note 101, R
at 1188 (“When the lines between acceptable and unacceptable conduct are bright, . . . parties can effectuate valid
bargains between themselves because they know in advance what behavior will be deemed acceptable. But the
line is not so bright between actions that are in good faith and those that are not.”).
401 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c), (e) (2005).
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good faith and fair dealing, the courts’ restrictive tack has preemptively
eliminated the effectiveness of the Covenant. As a result, parties to LLC
agreements in which fiduciary duties have been waived have a perverse
incentive to misbehave in the “right” way, knowing that the Implied
Covenant does not pose a genuine threat to curtail their conduct.402 This
could not have been the intent of the Delaware legislature—if it was, then
there would not have been a need to independently reference the Implied
Covenant in the alternative-entity statutes.
In Gotham, the Delaware Supreme Court zealously guarded fiduciary
duties, supposedly for the benefit of the complaining party in spite of
contrary statutory language. However, the Delaware courts are now
engaging in reverse Gotham-type analyses in which their holdings
sometimes undercut the legislature’s intent to limit absolute contractual
freedom, to the detriment of the complaining party. Thus, the pendulum
has swung too far, and the courts’ attempts to extract the parties’ intent
through the narrowest of lenses is no more faithful to parties’ true intent
than if the courts were to reinstate fiduciary duties after parties had
eliminated them.403
It is unclear whether a Delaware court will give meaningful practical
effect to the Implied Covenant protections afforded by the Delaware
statutes in the future.404 To do so would mean to broaden the scope of the
Covenant by engaging in an inquiry that is completely separate from
402 See Miller, supra note 30, at 604 (noting the “trail of opportunistic behavior created by the past decade R
of LLC litigation”); see also Keatinge, supra note 312 (listing opportunistic behavior as one of the issues that is most R
likely to arise in an LLC).
403 Cf. Means, supra note 306, at 1189–90 (“Although the hypothetical contract approach purports to R
advance the parties’ own autonomy interests by helping them to avoid economically irrational outcomes, it
actually gets no closer to the parties’ real bargain than does the blanket imposition of fiduciary duties drawn from
partnership law.” (footnote omitted)); see Phillips, supra note 101, at 1188 (“Courts may frame the expectations of R
the parties with no or only slight deference to the parties’ express expectations in the relationship. The result is
often counter to the purpose of effectuating the parties’ expectations in the relationship, leaving the bargaining
process and the negotiated contract unnecessarily bereft of certainty. It is the intrusion of the societal interest, and
the possibility of overriding contractual terms or even the entire contract, that creates the complexity and risk of
uncertainty in contractual relationships when the standard of conduct is unclear.” (footnotes omitted)). Current
good faith analyses in Delaware are prone to subjectivity because they are merely “stab[s] at approximating the
terms the parties would have negotiated had they foreseen the circumstances that have given rise to their dispute.”
Frey, 941 F.2d at 595.
404 Another revision of the Delaware statute may be necessary to achieve this goal. Cf. Catherine M.
Rogers, Business Organizations—Staying Afloat with a Hole in the Wyoming LLC Act: Default Rules in a Contractual
LLC World: Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82 P.3d 274 (Wyo. 2004), 5 WYO. L. REV. 351, 383–84 & n.210
(2005) (predicting the need for specialized statutory provisions in Wyoming to prevent majority opportunism and
abuse).
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fiduciary duties. As it stands, it would take the perfect storm to succeed on
an Implied Covenant claim: unsophisticated parties, an uncomplicated
agreement, ill will, unintentional silence on a contemplated matter, and
sufficient detail to suggest, but not reveal, the precise nature of the parties’
contemplations.405 It would be remarkable, indeed, if such a unique
combination of facts ever arose.
VII. CONCLUSION
The LLC is an attractive conglomeration of features, doctrines, and
laws from the partnership and corporate models of business organization.
However, Delaware’s clear policy of contractual flexibility and
independence in the arena of alternative-entity creation and governance
has transformed LLCs into entities that resist attempts to uniformly
classify, characterize, or predict the outcomes of disputes. It is precisely
because individualized contracts govern LLC disputes that a myriad of
widely-varying results is possible within one body of law.
When it comes to the Implied Covenant, a three-dimensional tension
arises. In one plane, Delaware law sanctions nearly absolute freedom of
contract. In another plane, fiduciary defaults operate in full, absent
contractual modification or elimination. In a third plane, the Implied
Covenant persists as a dormant obligation that applies to all contracts.
However, the Covenant only activates when it is triggered by the
Delaware courts, which have, as a general matter, opted to avoid
interfering with the natural effects of private ordering. In a hypothetical
situation in which the plane of fiduciary duties has been removed, the
courts’ contractual bent will likely lead them to interpret this removal as a
manifestation of intent to manage losses where they fall. However, this
narrow treatment has encouraged a curious misalignment between the
theoretically ideal operation of the Implied Covenant, and the practical
effectiveness of the Covenant as a means of re-allocating losses in a breach
of contract action. Moreover, there are no indications that this approach
405 Perhaps the lack of a fiduciary relationship could also be added to this list. As discussed supra Part
IV.C, when parties have a fiduciary relationship, Lonergan provides that they must retain fiduciary duties if they
want the court to conduct a loss re-allocation. Therefore, it appears that parties will not have any chance of
success on an Implied Covenant claim unless their relationship was not governed by fiduciary duties in the first
place. See Allied Capital Corp. v. GC-Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1024 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“Although
other legal doctrines—such as equitable principles of fiduciary duty . . . —might condemn the equity investment
if its terms were unfairly advantageous . . . , the plain terms of the [contract] preclude the notion that the
[contract] itself forbade that investment.”).
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helps courts come any closer to approximating the parties’ actual
intentions than a broader interpretation of the Covenant.
Parties who rely on the Implied Covenant to pick up where fiduciary
duties leave off are at a significant disadvantage because Delaware courts
have “trapped” the Implied Covenant between fiduciary duties and
express, contractually permitted conduct. First, an Implied Covenant
claim is deemed redundant if a plaintiff can sue for breach of fiduciary
duty under an agreement that retains these duties, which are wider
ranging, more likely to be breached, and better synchronized with
Delaware’s vast body of fiduciary-duty law. Second, not only is the
Covenant’s scope narrow to begin with, but because Delaware courts have
also conflated the Covenant with fiduciary duties, parties functionally
destroy the Covenant’s usefulness when they eliminate fiduciary duties
because Delaware courts will address the dispute as if the parties had
essentially eliminated the Covenant as well.
Ultimately, Delaware parties must beware of the consequences of
fiduciary waivers in this unique setting.406 The Implied Covenant and
fiduciary duties are obligations that operate in tandem. Attempting to
isolate the Covenant is a futile exercise—it can be done, but when
relationships sour, parties should not expect the Delaware courts to find
any sweetness in their deal.
406 Kleinberger, supra note 154, at 19 (“Freedom [of contract] has its risks, and . . . he who lives by the R
contractarian sword can get skewered by that sword . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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